DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam FPO San Francisco 96626

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From: Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam

Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet (Code 02H)

Subj: U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam Monthly Historical Summary; April 1969; submission of

Ref: (a) CINCPACFLT ltr ser 1/6925 of 2 October 1967

Encl: (1) Operation SEA LORDS Summary

(2) Operation SEA LORDS Statistical Summary by Campaign

(3) Coastal Surveillance Force Summary

(4) River Patrol Force Summary

(5) Riverine Assault Force Summary(6) USN Statistical Summary

(7) Naval Advisory Group Summary

(8) VNN/VNMC Statistical Summary

(9) Psychological and Civic Action Summary (10) USN Civic Action Statistical Summary

- 1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1) through (10) are submitted.
- 2. Due to a change in reporting procedures, the information for the USN Civic Action Statistical Summary is not available for the current month's Historical Surmary. The Civic Action Statistical Surmary will carry the figures for the previous month's work i.e., April Historical Summary contains March's Civic Action Statistical Summary.
- 3. The data contained in enclosures (2), (6), (8), and (10) is based on information available this date. Any adjustments to enclosures (2), (6), (8) and (10) will be reflected in April's Historical Supplement.

Copy to: COMUSMACV (Hist. Branch SJS) CNO (Op-09B9lE) Director of Maval History

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OPERATION SEA LORDS SUMMARY April 1969

Coordinated efforts of units from the three major in-country U. S.
Navy task forces together with other U. S. and Vietnamese armed forces
continued to maintain pressure on the enemy in each SEA LORDS campaign
during April. In general enemy opposition declined during the month with
the GIANT SLINGSHOT operations continuing to make contact most frequently.
In this operation along the Vam Co Tay and Vam Co Dong rivers some enemy
initiated activity was encountered daily, but there were a number of days
with only one minor incident.

Operations in the other interdiction campaigns of BARRIER REEF,
TRAN HUNG DAO, and SEARCH TURN, as well as certain rivers where MARKET
TIME "Raiders" operated on a near daily basis, followed a general pattern
wherein enemy initiated fire fight activity was not encountered for a
week or more, only to be followed by a sizeable engagement with well emplaced and heavily armed Viet Cong units. Prompt reaction by fixed wing
aircraft and/or helicopters providing air cover coupled with frequent
insertion of reaction troops already embarked in the patrol craft and employment of other supporting arms remained the best counter to these
attacks. The shift of night patrol tactics toward establishing night
ambush positions at likely crossing points in lieu of random patrol continued to show good results in the number of friendly initiated contacts.

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Giant Slingshot Campaign

River patrol craft, river assault craft, minesweeping craft, and supporting units from TF 116 and TF 117 continued GTANT SLINGSHOT interdiction operations along the Vam Co Tay and Vam Co Dong Rivers as elements of TG 194.9. Until 7 April "Swift" boats of TF 115 carried out patrols on the Vam Co River when this segment of GTANT SLINGSHOT was taken over by PBR's in order to allow increased "Swift" boat patrols on the lower Ham Luong and Co Chien rivers in the normal GAME WARDEN area of operations. Also participating in this interdiction campaign were VNN River Assault and Interdiction Divisions 70 and 71 (RAID-70 and 71). As in prior months numerous operations were carried out in support of friendly ground sweeps and patrols of the river banks.

The amount of enemy opposition increased slightly during April with the number of enemy initiated hostile fire incidents up to 74 from 65 in March. The focus of enemy attention also appeared to be shifting from the Vam Co Dong to the Vam Co Tay, possibly indicating a major change in enemy infiltration routes. There were also five enemy attacks on GIANT SLINGSHOT bases and support elements or nearby friendly installations. Friendly casualties during April included 6 USN killed and 69 wounded. Other forces working with U. S. Navy units lost 7 killed and 77 wounded. Damage was received by 29 USN and 7 VNN water craft with 5 of them damaged, extensively. One incident resulted in the loss of two USN helicopters and damage to a supporting U. S. Army helicopter.



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Night ambush tactics by patrol units were employed frequently again in April resulting in 88 contacts which made up the bulk of Navy inflicted enemy casualties. Routine patrols also engaged evading junks or sampans at least 16 times with good results. Reactions to hostile fire, targets of opportunity, and tactical intelligence in the form of naval gunfire, artillery fire, and strikes by helicopters or fixed wing aircraft numbered nearly 100 for the month. Including the results of ground sweeps supported by GIANT SLINGSHOT units plus air strikes and artillery fire the enemy lost 504 killed (367 body count plus 137 probable), 21 wounded, and 39 captured. Material losses came to 26 junks or sampans and 215 structures destroyed with another 2 craft damaged and 16 captured plus 9 structures damaged. Ground sweeps uncovered 3 arms caches in the GIANT SLINGSHOT area during April. These caches plus arms captured in direct combat totaled 76 individual and 12 crewserved weapons: Some 90 B-40 rounds, nearly 50 mortar/recoilless rifle rounds, approximately 100 grenades, and miscellaneous mines and explosives were also included in the captured munitions.

On 2 April, two ASPB's were transiting south on the Vam Co Dong river when they came under B-40 rocket-grenade and automatic-weapons attack at 1420, three and a half miles southeast of Tra Cu (XS 529 945). One ASPB took a rocket hit in the after gun station which was seen to detonate in the immediate vicinity of LCDR C. L. PETERSON, USN, killing him. LCDR PETERSON was Commander River Squadron 57 and Vam Co Dong on-



scene commander. His body was lost overboard during the ensuing battle. In addition, two USN were seriously wounded, one of the casualties being LT David M. BEE (MC), USNR, from YEBM-18. PBR's of TU 194.1 were scrambled to assist in the counter attack and artillery fire was placed on the ambush area within eight minutes. Seawolves arrived and provided cover for dustoff, as the wounded were medevaced to the Army evacuation hospital at Cu Chi by 1500. Enemy casualties were unknown. LCDR Peterson's body was subsequently found.

Just after midnight on 2 April, PBR's 740 and 769 were in waterborne ambush position about 3½ miles south of Go Dau Ha (XT 398 190) and detected a sampan with eight to 10 personnel crossing from west to east. They took the sampan under fire and destroyed it. Enemy casualties were listed as eight killed and two probably killed. There were no U. S. casualties.

On April 6, while in night waterborne ambush position on the Vam Co Dong river, 4 miles northeast of the Ben Luc Bridge, (XS 557 807), two ASPB's of Task Unit 194.9.5 detected two sampans travelling north along the west bank. The sampans were illuminated and taken under fire at a range of about 20 feet at 2100, resulting in three Viet Cong killed and the capture of enemy arms, food and equipment.

On 9 April PBR's 82 and 149 in waterborne ambush on the south bank of the Vam Co Tay River, 4 miles northeast of Tuyen Nhon, observed six Viet Cong approaching the bank. When the enemy closed to 10 meters,

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observed in the ambush area and the units returned for another firing run. A sampan with four Viet Cong was observed attempting to cross the river and enter a canal on the south bank. The boats took the sampan and both banks under fire. The sampan exploded with a series of fireballs 75 feet high. A large secondary explosion which caused a large fire was observed on the north bank. The PBR's made three firing runs through the area and received light automatic weapons fire from the north bank. On the last firing run an explosion lifted the stern of PBR 149 out of the water and caused the boat to start filling with water. The boat was beached, pumped out, and then returned to base for repairs (later it was returned to duty). Enemy losses were seven killed and an additional three listed as probables and one sampan destroyed.

Five RAID 71 units were in transit from Tra Cu to Ben Luc on 9

April when they spotted a sampan crossing the river from east to west

(XS 530 932). Warning shots were fired but the sampan attempted toevade and the boats commenced firing at the sampan. Although the sampan overturned before the Vietnamese sailors reached it, they recovered
the four dead occupants, four knives, and some miscellaneous clothing.

In the afternoon two of the units were returning to Tra Cu when they came
under rocket and automatic weapons fire (XS 546 925). Although they
returned and suppressed the fire, one sailor was wounded and one boat

Enclosure (1)

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took a B-40 rocket hit that disabled both engines. The stricken vessel was taken in tow by the other units and they cleared the area to the south. U. S. PBR's arrived on the scene and placed fire on two Viet Cong that were spotted by aircraft. The ambush site was flamed by a U. S. Zippo boat that was dispatched to the area.

On 10 April PBR's on routine patrol of the Vam Co Dong River came under rocket and automatic weapons attack five miles southeast of Tra The cover boat, PBR 96, received two B-40 hits simultaneously. One rocket hit the coxswain flat and killed the captain instantly. The second rocket struck just aft of the coxswain's flat blowing down into the engine compartment, injuring the entire boat crew. The boat ran out of control and beached on the bank opposite from the enemy ambush. The lead boat, while still under fire, reversed course, returned to the beached boat, and removed the wounded personnel but was unable to recover to boat captain's body because of intense enemy fire. The lead boat cleared the kill zone to the south to a medevac position where the wounded were dusted off. Additional PBR's were scrambed from Tra Cu to go to the assistance of the engaged units. Three PBR's pulled the beached boat free and towed it back to Tra Cu with Seawolves providing air cover. Artillery fire and LHFT strikes were placed on the enemy positions when the friendly forces were clear. Enemy casualties were unknown, while U. S. casualties were one killed and five wounded.

At 1910 on 12 April, a routine patrol for reconnaissance of water-DECLASSIFIED

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borne ambush positions, consisting of two PBR's, two ASPB's, four ATC's and a monitor, was attacked by B-40 and automatic weapons fire from the west bank of the upper Vam Co Dong, ll miles northwest of Tra Cu (XT 392 176). Two ATC's received hits at the waterline and left the scene to effect temporary repairs. Fire was returned and artillery was called in. Three ATC's which had been diverted from a regular patrol to assist in placing harassment and interdiction fire arrived at the ambush site at 2056 and immediately received enemy fire from both banks. Two of these ATC's received hits causing minor material damage. Helo gunships were scrambled and placed strikes on the enemy positions until 2236. Nine sailors were wounded (one serious, three minor and five slight) in the action and enemy casualties were unknown.

During the period 181922H to 190805H, two ATC's inserted, supported and extracted 80 U. S. Army Ninth Infantry Division troops in the Vam Co Dong River, 4½ miles southeast of the Ben Luc Bridge (XS 655 688).

During the operation the ground troops made contact with a North Vietnamese Army force which resulted in five NVA killed.

On the evening of 27 April, a PBR patrol sighted a sampan with eight men crossing the Vam Co Dong River one mile north of Ben Luc (XS 603 772). As warning shots were fired the occupants of the sampan jumped into the river. Attempts by the patrol to capture the swimmers met with no success when the swimmers refused to surrender willingly. Two additional PBR's were scrambled to assist in the capture operation. As



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the enemy began to reach the river bank they were taken under fire and killed when capture was impossible and escape was imminent. The patrol did manage to capture two Viet Cong from the waters edge and one wounded Viet Cong from the bank. Two of the Viet Cong made the shore and were 10 meters inland when they were fired upon and killed by the reinforcing PBR's. At the same time one Navyman was wounded by a booby trap on the beach as three of the crewmen attempted to take prisoners. Seawolves were scrambled to assist in the encounter and put a strike in the field surrounding the action. U. S. casualties were limited to the one wounded man. Enemy casualties were five killed and three captured (one of these wounded). One of the POW's was a North Vietnamese regular.

On the morning of 28 April, Seawolves 37 and 38 engaged a target of opportunity, consisting of numerous sampans, about 7 miles northeast of Moc Hoa (XS 140 950). They placed strikes on the target and received no return fire. While turning away from the target so as to clear the Cambodian border, the wing aircraft, Seawolf 37, received destructive fire and radioed he was going down. The aircraft crashed and exploded on contact. The lead aircraft spotted one crewman of the downed helo attempting to clear the wreckage and turned to provide cover and extraction. At this point the lead helo received fire that damaged the oil system and caused a forced landing about 35 meters from the crash site. The crewmen evacuated the aircraft and set up a defense perimeter. One man raced to the burning helo to aid the man attempting to free himself. An Army Slick



Heavy automatic weapons fire wounded both door gumners of the Slick. As the personnel were loaded aboard the Slick, one man from Seawolf 38 was killed by enemy fire after he was seated in the rescue aircraft. U. S. casualties were four killed, and four wounded, including the Slick door gumners. Seawolf 38 was observed to be hit by an unknown mortar and burst into flames from a direct hit. Both aircraft had gone down just inside the Cambodian border.

Barrier Reef Campaign

Routine interdiction patrols and floating night ambushes continued as standard operating procedure for the forces involved in Barrier Reef east and west along the Lagrange, Ong Lon, Dong Tien Canals. Enemy contact was in general very light throughout the month with only four enemy initiated fire fights being recorded. Enemy casualties for April were 23 killed (12 probable) and one wounded. There were two structures and one sampan damaged during encounters. Navy casualties were three wounded.

On 2 April, TU 194.6.2 relieved TU 194.6.4 on Barrier Reef West and USS CARRETT COUNTY with RIVDIV 554 departed the area. From six through 11 April intensified patrols and night ambushes were conducted in Barrier Reef West in support of 44th Special Tactical Zone operations. Troop insertions were conducted by TU 194.6.2 on five occasions. All resulted in negative contact. There were no mining incidents during



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the month. On two occasions Barrier Reef West forces came to the assistance of friendly forces engaged with the enemy.

TE 194.9.3.1 (PBR's 148 and 78) units provided a blocking force for Kien Tuong PRU Team in contact with an estimated 40 Viet Cong on 18 April, approximately 4 miles southwest of Ap Bac (XS 100 689). The PRU's requested assistance and Seawolves were scrambled and placed a strike on the enemy positions. An CV-10A on visual reconnaissance flight was diverted to the scene and placed a strike on the enemy forces while the Seawolves had withdrawn to rearm. The Seawolves returned to place a second strike on the area. The PRU's were subsequently extracted by an Army Slick. There were no friendly casualties. Enemy casualties were three killed by the PRU's and two killed by the OV-10A. This was the first use of coordinated air support using Seawolves and OV-10A's in this area.

On 25 April a farmer reported to Vietnamese authorities in Tram Chim that 100 Viet Cong were moving east about three miles to the southeast (WS 650 760). One PBR patrol with an ASPB and an ATC fired into the area. The naval units were able to see the Viet Cong in the fields during the attack. During the attack the Viet Cong retreated south into a nearby village. After firing, one PBR with the ASPB departed the area and the other two boats assumed ambush positions along the Dong Tien Canal. These units observed a Vietnamese outpost (WS 668 793) under fire at 0315 on the 26th and responded by providing support fire. At this time the boats received small arms and mortar fire from the north bank of the canal. The other half of the patrol

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arrived on the scene and joined the firefight. One MSD, two PBR's and an ASPB were scrambled from Tram Chim and supported the units under fire. Seawolves were scrambled and placed strikes on both sides of the canal at the estimated enemy positions. The enemy fire was suppressed. One Navyman had been wounded on the ATC and was medevaced by the MSD. Seven Vietnamese at the outpost were medevaced by PBR. Enemy casualties were unknown. It is believed that the first Viet Cong fired on were enroute to ambush PBR's when they were surprised and changed their plans, attacking instead the outpost for possible future use as a position for PBR ambush, after assuming the boat patrol had left the area. The Viet Cong had used .30 and .50 caliber machineguns in their attack on the outpost and had succeeded in cutting the perimeter wire and entering the compound before they were driven back.

TRAN HUNG DAO Campaign

The routine patrols of U. S. and VNN Swift boats, U. S. PBR's and VNN junks and FOM's (French river patrol boats) on the Rach Giang
Thanh and Vinh Te Canal were carried out with almost no interruptions from the enemy. Special SEAL, LDNN and reaction team operations had similar results. Five enemy initiated fire fights and two fire fights initiated by friendly forces occurred during the month. Friendly casualties for the month included three VNN and one PF killed and three VNN, one U. S. SEAL, and one local soldier wounded. Enemy casualties were unknown.



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Although the level of enemy activity was lower than previous months, there were several incidents when friendly forces did detect enemy movements. On 2 April VNN reaction troops and local PF's were sweeping the north bank of the Vinh Te Canal 5 miles southwest of Chau Doc (WS 065 807) when they came under some automatic and rifle grenade fire. The troops returned the fire and advanced toward the Viet Cong. The chase ended very quickly as the enemy fled across the border into Cambodia.

Shortly after dark on 5 April VNN reaction troop and CIDG forces sighted four Viet Cong who were attempting to cross the canal (VS 590 633) in inner tubes. Taking them under fire the friendly troops came under B-41 rocket grenade, small arms, and mortar attack from an unknown number of Viet Cong on the north bank. VNN junks proceeded to the ambush site and provided gunfire support. Contact was broken off and the troops were extracted. Later the same evening, the troops were inserted for a sweep of the area while U. S. and VNN PCF's provided illumination. The Viet ong had fled the area as nothing was found.

VNN junks and reaction troops had set a routine ambush on the early morning of 21 April when they received word that the reaction force base camp southwest of Chau Doc (WS 082 798) was under RPG and mortar attack. The ambush team moved their position in order to cut off a possible Viet Cong retreat route and one command junk commenced firing 81-mm illumination rounds. Around 0400 they secured the ambush to search for three missing VNN troops. All three were later found dead.



SEARCH TURN Campaign

Operations by patrol craft of TU 116.1.3 in the routine patrol area on the Rach Gia-Long Xuyen and Rach Soi canals made no contact with enemy forces during April. Routine patrols by PBR's continued in the shallow coastal areas of Rach Gia Bay. Numerous special patrols on escort missions were carried out on adjoining and interconnecting waterways such as the Bo The, Tri Ton, Rach Gia-Ha Tien, and Can Gao canals and Cai Be and Cai Lon rivers. During these operations hostile fire was encuntered three times during the month resulting in three PBR crewmen wounded and minor damage to two craft. Firing on four suspected enemy positions and one evading sampan the patrol units killed one Viet Cong, destroyed five and damaged three structures, and detained a sampan with one female suspect and 1,500 pounds of rice, while keeping the waterways open to commerce and denying their use to the enemy.

In Kien Giang Province, approximately 18 kilometers north of Rach Gia (WS 071 246), elements of TU 116.1.3 came under enemy B-40 rocket and automatic weapons fire of about five minutes duration at 2240 on - 1 April. Seawolves were scrambled and placed the first of two strikes at 2340. The PBR's exited the firing area at 2350. Three Navymen were wounded and medevaced as a result of the attack. Two PBR's were damaged but repairable. Enemy casualties were unknown. The area of the attack has been suspected as a Viet Cong crossing point for the inland supply route through Kien Giang Province. Movement of known enemy units and

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the appearance of an unknown unit of an approximate 80-man strength indicates that a load of supplies was due to be moved along the route. PBR patrol tactics may have interrupted an enemy crossing attempt.

Just before midnight on 14 April, a PBR patrol on the Cai Lon River, 20 miles southeast of Rach Gia (WR 197 770), sighted a sampan with two occupants. When the sampan was hailed, one occupant jumped over the side and swam toward the beach. He was taken under fire and probably killed. The remaining occupant was taken into custody along with the sampan which contained 1500 pounds of rice. There were no U. S. casualties.

MARKET TIME Raider Campaign

Enemy base areas and fortifications along the navigable waterways open to coastal waters along IV Corps were hit frequently by the combined sea, ground and air punch of the Swift boat river incursion operations. Operations on rivers such as the Bay Hap, Cua Lon and Bo De continued on an almost daily basis and included several night patrols employing night ambush tactics. Enemy opposition was generally light with hostile fire being suppressed without friendly casualties in all but three of 18 incidents. Including one river incursion and troop support mission carried out by the Ham Luong and Co Chien River patrols, two by Third Coastal Zone WPB's and one river probe in the First Coastal Zone (in addition to SEA TIGER operations), a total of 49 special river operations were carried out during April.





One of three series of Swift boat river incursions (mission number 422) in support of Operation SILVER MACE II in southern Ca Mau Peninsula from 12 through 15 April employed as many as 13 craft at one time and encountered the strongest enemy opposition. In one encounter one Swift boat was destroyed, four damaged, three crewmen killed, and another 33 wounded. (This action is discussed in the SILVER MACE II Campaign section.) MARKET TIME Raider mission number 416 on the Song Bay Hap on 9 and 10 April and mission number 424 on the Song Cua Lon and adjoining waterways on 17 and 18 April also were conducted in support of SILVER MACE II.

Additional friendly casualties included six craft damaged and three crewmen wounded by hostile fire. Supporting aircraft came under fire eight times with one helicopter receiving minor electrical damage from an automatic weapons hit. Troops embarked in the Swift boats or supported during sweep operations lost three killed and 16 wounded during the river incursions. Enemy damage and casualties were substantially higher as naval gunfire and ground forces combined to clear the area south of the Cua Lon River of several enemy held villages. During April naval gunfire by Swift boats and off shore support units killed 55 Viet Cong (12 body count plus 43 estimated) and wounded 10. A total of 582 craft were destroyed or heavily damaged and another 1,397 structures or bunkers were destroyed and damaged.

On the afternoon of the 4th, PCF's 56, 57, 95 and 102 made a two-hour transit of the Kinh Quan Chanh Bo and six connecting canals and rivers





from the lower Bassac to the South China Sea through the Long Toan

Secret Zone. Entering the canal 40 miles southeast of Can Tho (XR 412 627)

the four craft took targets of opportunity under fire as they moved

along the Kinh Quan Chanh Bo, Kinh Lang Sac, Rach Lang Sac, Rach An,

Rach Saw, Song Lang Chim, and Song Lang Nuoc. By the time they reached

the open sea 70 miles south of Saigon (XR 730 720) the river probe

accounted for 11 sampans and 7 bunkers destroyed and one structure

damaged.

On the morning of 9 April PCF's 21, 23, 31, 93 and 103 entered the Song Ong Doc (VQ 7998) with Mobile Strike Force (MSF) troops embarked. As they proceeded up river light small arms fire was received from the river bank. At a point seven miles up river (VR 908 005) the force came under small arms, automatic weapons, and recoilless rifle fire. One recoilless rifle round hit PCF 31 but failed to detonate causing only a small hole at the waterline. After suppressing the enemy fire and clearing the area PCF 31 was escorted back to sea by two additional Swift boats sent up river. Strikes by an Army IHFT and naval gunfire from USCGC MENDOTA (WHEC 69) were placed on the enemy position. More small arms was encountered by the PCF's still on the river and the LHFT without friendly casualties. After leaving the river to rearm the Swift boats proceeded 5 miles up river (VR 888 002) and put the MSF ashore on the south bank in mid-afternoon. Following the departure of these units from the river at the completion of the ground sweep,



PCF's 22, 67, and 94 entered the river to establish night blocking patrols. The purpose of the operation was to intercept Viet Cong which might attempt to head north across the river as they evaded the forces of SILVER MACE II operating to the south. Early on the 10th PCF's 31, 38, 43, and 71 took over the continuing blocking patrol. At a point about 6 miles up river PCF 71 received minor damage from a recoilless rifle hit and one MSF was wounded. Other than light small arms fire the patrols continued without incident until termination that evening. In addition to suppressing hostile fire the Swift boats, MSF, LHFT, and fixed wing aircraft took targets of opportunity under fire in what local authorities had declared a totally restricted zone along the river. Results included 17 structures and nine sampans destroyed, 15 structures and 2 sampans damaged, and one Viet Cong estimated killed in action.

On 10 April three PCF's supported by a LHFT made the deepest penetration to date of the Song My Thanh proceeding inland to within a few miles of Bac Lieu (WR 8328). Shortly after PCF's 35, 54, and 96 entered the river 48 miles southeast of Can Tho (XR 3141) the LHFT encountered anti-aircraft fire from enemy positions south of the river. USCGC POINT GREY was standing by off shore and quickly suppressed the hostile fire with her mortar and machine guns. No other contact was made during the transit which disclosed several ARVN troops and Vietnamese flags along the pacified sections of the waterway. Taking targets of opportunity under fire which were sighted from the river or by a spotter aircraft overhead in prearranged free fire zone the

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following results were recorded: 32 sampans and 18 structures destroyed, 6 sampans and 91 structures damaged, and 5 Viet Cong killed (2 body count plus 3 probable).

SILVER MACE II Campaign

An extensive and coordinated SEA LORDS strike operation of limited duration took place from 7-18 April as U. S. Navy and Vietnamese Navy and Marine Corps forces combined to invade deep into the Viet Cong santuary in the Nam Can Forest area of the Ca Mau Peninsula at the southern tip of Vietnam. Under the tactical command of CTG 194.7, participating forces included 29 river assault craft of River Assault Squadron (RAS) 13, three battalions of Vietnamese Marines (about 2400 troops), 25 Vietnamese River Assault Group boats, 13 PCF's of TG 194.5, and various gunfire and logistical support units such as USS CARRONADE (IFS-1), CROCKETT (PG-88), MERCER (ABP-39), WESTCHESTER COUNTY (IST -1169), HAMPSHIRE COUNTY (IST-819), SATYR (ARL-23), KRISHNA (ARL-38), Navy Seawolf helicopters, SEAL and EOD teams, and a substantial force of Vietnamese supply vessels. A U. S. Army surgical team and medevac helo were aboard MERCER to render medical assistance.

Units rendezvoused in the Gulf of Thailand off the western mouth of the Gua Lon River and on the opposite side of the peninsula in the South China Sea east of the Bo De River in preparation for scheduled beach assault landings on 7 April. After airstrikes and Naval beach preparation fire, riverine assault landings commenced at the 4th Battalion VNMC went ashore

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in the vicinity of Nam Can on the Song Cua Lon (VQ 986 667) and 6th Battalion VNMC troops were landed near Tan An on the Song Bo De (WQ 215 684). All landings were unopposed and without incident. The first enemy initiated incident of the campaign occurred at 1050 on the 7th on the Song Dam Noi (WQ 263 830) when a command detonated mine exploded 30 feet astern of one of four PCF's escorting a Vietnamese re-supply force from Ca Man to the operating area. No personnel or material casualties were sustained. The same task element later received heavy automatic weapons fire further downstream (WQ 270 785) at 1130. One MSF troop aboard a PCF was slightly wounded but no material damage was sustained as the boats continued toward the AO.

The only significant enemy ground contact of the campaign occurred on 8 April as 4th Battalion VNMC troops established contact twice, first with a Viet Cong squad in the morning; and at 1355 when heavy contact was gained with an estimated platoon siz: element near the south beach of the Song Cua Lon 3 miles east of Man Can (WQ 040 674). A LHFT and fixed wing aircraft placed a strike consisting of bombs, napalm, and strafing fire on the enemy position at 1900 with unknown results.

Reconnaissance in force operations continued as over 60 assault landings (6 by PCF) were made throughout the area of operations during the campaign. Further enemy contact was very light as VNMC troops swept the area discovering substantial weapons caches, destroying Viet Cong bunkers and structures and detaining suspicious persons. RAC operations included RARE (Riverine Assault Reconnaissance Element) Eagle Float, PSYOPS, and blocking





force actions as they supported units of the 1st, 4th, and 6th battalions of the VNMC (The 6th Battalions VNMC was replaced by the 1st Battalion on 12 April.). PCF's conducted gunfire support, river raid, and troop lift activity throughout the campaign. Wide areas along the Rachs Ong Quyen, Ba Thank, Cai Chon, Duong Keo, Cai Nhap and the Songs Bo De, Dam Noi and along the Qua Lon and navigable streams in the southeast Cau Mau area were searched out by the U.S./Vietnamese Navy and VNMC teams.

Eight PCF's, with 6th Battalion VNMC troops embarked, sailed the Duong Keo River during late afternoon on 12 April for sweep operations in the day's objective area. At 1734, a large scale enemy initiated firefight by an estimated two Viet Cong companies was unleashed as the PCF's in column formation reached a position 4 miles upstream from the river mouth (VQ 046 544). Detonation of two claymore mines from the north set bank was immediately followed by intensive B-40 rocket, recoilless rifle (R/R), .30 and .50 caliber machine-gun, rifle-grenade and small-arms fire. PCF 43 was hit by R/R and B-40 rounds which disabled her steering gear and fatally wounded the boat skipper, LTJG D. G. DROZ. The boat beached at high speed in the center of the ambush site, as B-40 rockets continued to smash into her. Uninjured crewmen and UDT personnel aboard set up a hasty perimeter around the boat as PCF's 5 and 31 returned alongside to assist the stricken PCF 43, at the same time maintaining a heavy volume of fire. Seawolves reacted in five minutes and placed heavy machine gun

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fire into the area. Enemy fire was suppressed. All personnel were removed from PCF 43 and PCF's 5 and 31 cleared the area. Later, a fire in PCF 43 reached UDT ammunition stores on board and created an explosion which destroyed the craft. Final results of the disaster were three U. S. Navy personnel killed and 33 wounded and two Vietnamese Marines killed and 13 wounded. One PCF (43) was destroyed, two others were badly damaged, and two others received moderate damage. Enemy losses were 18 Viet Cong killed (2 body count and 16 estimated).

During an overflight of the operations area in a light observation helo at 0845 on 16 April, the Commander of TG 194.7 spotted enemy personnel setting up a probable ambush on the Song Cua Lon (WQ 198 715). RAC units transiting the area at the time were halted and VNMC artillery was called in on the site, causing two secondary explosions. RAC then landed one company of the 6th Battalion VNMC on the site at 0952 but no contact was gained. A potential ambush of the RAC was thus averted.

Operations concluded on 18 April as all units departed the area.

Demonstrated again was the capability of riverine forces to conduct conventional amphibious operations in conjunction with riverine operations in a remote area with a minimum of outside logistical support. Results of the operation showed 38 Viet Cong killed (21 body count and 17 probable) and 47 sampans and 209 structures destroyed. In excess of 4,400 assorted rounds types of enemy ammunition, and over 380 enemy weapons, were captured. Seven hostile fire incidents were encountered in the campaign, including an

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ENIFF on the Song Cai Tu in Chuong Thien Province on 22 April as RAC were enroute to the MRB after completion of the SILVER MACE II Campaign (Six USN were wounded in this encounter.).

Operation SEA LORDS Campaign in Enemy Base Area 480

CTG 194.7, with 20 RAC of River Assault Squadron 15 and the 6th Battalion Vietnamese Marine Corps, commenced an operation SEA LORDS riverine assault and interdiction operation in the Twin rivers area (enemy base area 480) of Chuong Thien Province on 25 April. As in previous operations in this area, the mission was assigned to interdict enemy forces using the area as a staging and support base for the conduct of offensive operations in adjoining provinces.

The RAC/VNMC combination conducted unopposed landings along the Rach Nga Ba Dinh (WR 318 618) to begin the campaign. Ground contact with the enemy was insignificant as assault operations spread to areas along the Song Cai Tu, Rach Cai Lon and Kinh Xang Cut.

Confrontation with the enemy were not absent, however, as four enemy initiated firefights took place in April. ASPB-132-3 was sunk by a water-mine explosion beneath its stern on 29 April on the Song Cai Tu 10 miles southwest of Vu Thanh. Another ASPB was lightly damaged as the RAC transited in company with Vietnamese RAG 25 units. One sailor was killed, one declared missing and 10 wounded in the mine blast.

As the operation continued into May enemy casualties included seven Viet Cong killed (6 body count plus 1 probable) and 12 captured.





OPERATION SEA LORDS STATISTICAL SUMMARY BY CAMPAIGN April 1969

Enemy casualties:	GIANT SLINGSHOT	BARRIER REEF	TRAN HUNG DAO
a. Killed b. Wounded c. Captured	177(BC)+117(EST) 9 4	1	l(EST)
USN casualties:	4	0 _	0
a. Killed	6 USN & 7 VN	. 0	3 VNN
b. Wounded	69 USN & 77 VN	3 USN & 7 VAN	1 USN & 3 VNN
c. Captured	0	0	0
b. Missing	0	0	Ö
Enemy material losses	:		i
a. Destroyed:		av	
(1) Junks or			
sampans	19	0	0
(2) Structures	94	0	0
b. Captured:			
(1) Junks: or			* oc v
sampans	12	0	0
(2) Weapons	88	1	1
(3) Ammunition			(e)
(rounds)	*	l(Mine)	2 (B-40)
(4) Rice (tons)) *	0	0.8
c. Damaged:	H = 18		
(1) Junks or			
sampans	2 5	1 2	0
(2) Structures	5	2	<u>)</u>
USN material losses:			T TOS
a. Destroyed:	0.		
(1) Surface cra		0 .	0 _
(2) Helicopters	2	0	0 '
b. Damaged	01 00		
(1) Surface cra		0	0
(2) Helicopters		O	0
Hostile fire incidents	103	14	7

NOTE: * Information not available

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OPERATION SEA LORDS STATISTICAL SUMMARY BY CAMPAIGN (CONT'T) April 1969

			MARKET	
Enemy casualties:	SEARCH TURN		TIME RAIDER*	SILVER MACE II**
a, Killed	5 (EST)		12(BC)+43(EST)	21(BC)+17(EST)
b. Wounded	10		10	0
c, Captured	0		0	3
USN casualties:		1		on on
a. Killed	0		3 USN & 3 VNMC	3 USN(PCF) // VNMC (PCF)
b. Wounded	3		36 USN & 16 MSF/	110 USA (33 on PCF)
c. Captured	0		VNMC	36 VNMC(13 on PCF)
d. Missing	0 0		0	0 *
Enemy material losses:			0	0
a. Destroyed:				*
(1) Junks or				
sampans	1		542	47
(2) Structures	0		793	209
b: Captured:			122	207
(1) Junks or			,	96
sampans	0		0	3
(2) Weapons	0		. 0	382
(3) Ammunition	er Cont			
(rounds)	0		***	4426
(4) Rice (tons)	0		3.6	3
c. Damaged:				
(1) Junks or	0		1 -	11
sampans (2) Structures	0		40	5 2
USN material losses:	0		604	2
a, Destroyed				•
(1) Surface cra	ft o		1	7 (707)
(2) Helicopters	0		1	l(PCF)
b. Damaged:	Ü		U	0
(1) Surface cra	ft 2		10	7
(2) Helicopters	0		1	í
Hostile fire incidents	4		10	8
				O .

Includes operations supporting SILVER MACE II Includes PCF MARKET TIME Raider operations NOTE: *

**

Information not avalable ***

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COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCE SUMMARY April 1969

Detections of junks and sampans by MARKET TIME surveillance units increased again in April as weather and sea conditions continued to improve in the coastal waters of South Vietnam. The total of 49,258 detections in April represents a 13 percent rise in coastal activity over March. Patrol effectiveness improved significantly as the percentage of detected craft which were checked by inspection or boarding rose from 63 percent in March to 73 percent in April. A total of 26,064 inspections and 10,088 boardings of junks and sampans resulted in the detention of 960 persons, including 54 Viet Cong suspects. In addition, Swift boat patrols on the Vam Co River supporting Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT until 7 April and in the normal GAME WARDEN river patrol areas of the lower Ham Luong and Co Chien rivers dete ed 9,075 craft, inspected 2,622 and boarded 4,905. Steel hull detections in MARKET TIME patrol areas came to 1,144 with no suspicious activity disclosed by 838 inspections and 61 boardings.

Other routine river patrol operations continued on the Rach Giang
Thanh as part of Operation TRAN HUNG DAO and in the First Coastal
Zone on the Cua Dai River. The latter river patrol campaign, extending
8 miles into an area haboring strong enemy units, was given the code
name Operation SEA TIGER in April. During the month activity on the
Cua Dai River increased sharply with the two boat patrols carrying

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out 78 gunfire support missions, including 16 instances of hostile fire suppression; two evading sampans were taken under fire, and seven ground operations along the river were supported. In addition to receiving rocket and automatic weapons fire 16 times, the SEA TIGER patrols encountered two enemy water mine attacks. However, friendly casualties were less than in March with four crewmen wounded and three Swift boats receiving moderate damage. Enemy material losses were up reflecting the increase in SEA TIGER naval gunfire. A total of 48 junks and sampans and 34 structures were destroyed and three craft and 34 structures received heavy damage. In addition, Swift boat mortar and gunfire killed at least 10 Viet long (1 body count plus 9 probable).

Naval gunfire support missions carried out during normal MARKET TIME patrols during April totals 452. This includes 20 cases of hostile fire suppression and six evading craft taken under fire. MARKET TIME patrols also provided blocking patrols or inserted troops along the coast in direct support of 10 ground operations. Material losses inflicted on the enemy totaled 79 junks or sampans and 14 basket boats destroyed and another 37 craft damaged. In addition a total of 151 structures were destroyed and another 198 heavily damaged. Enemy casualties came to 38 killed (17 body count plus 21 probable) and 26 wounded. There were no friendly casualties or material losses due to enemy action in normal MARKET TIME operations. As in previous months since the beginning of operation SEA LORDS the river incursions by



"Swift" boats continued to score heavily against enemy units along the rivers and canals of IV Corps.

During April SEAL units attached to TF 115 carried out 12 special operations in the coastal area. Hostile fire was encountered once with no friendly losses. During these operations five Viet Cong were killed and one wounded by the SEALs. In addition, one structure was destroyed and two sampans were damaged.

On the evening of 7 April USCGC POINT PATRIDGE was on patrol in the mouth of the Ham Luong River when six people were sighted in a clearing on the south bank (XR 764 900). They were taken under fire from a range of 5,000 yards with sector approval and confirmation that no friendly units were in the area. Expending 11 rounds of mortar fire the cutter covered the target area well and observed two enemy killed and the other four were estimated to have been either killed or wounded.

While on routine SEA TIGHR patrol on 13 April PCF's 61 and 70 received small arms fire from a point 3 miles up the north channel of the Gua Dai River. The hostile fire was returned with mortar and machine gun fire and sampans and structures in the area were also taken under fire. The Swift boats destroyed four hootches, three bunkers, and four sampans while damaging five hootches and six bunkers. There were no friendly casualties.

On 16 April USCGC MENDOTA (WHEC 61) engaged enemy troops, bunkers and structures along the Song Ong Doc (VQ 868 987) with the aid of an

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Army spotter aircraft. Expending 139 rounds from her five-inch gun the cutter destroyed nine structures and four bunkers, damaged another four structures and two sampans, ignited a large secondary fire, and killed eight Viet Cong (3 by body count and 5 estimated). During the mission a nearby junk apparently interpreted the cutter! (3) gunfire as a signal to come along side for boarding because it closed the cutter twice only to be turned away by .50 caliber rounds fired across its bow. After the second pass the junk master put away the registration papers he had been holding up and left the area, possibly slightly confused.

On the afternoon of the 19th PCF's 24 and 79 on SEA TIGER patrols were headed and about 2 miles from the river mouth (BT 186 545) when they came under rocket and automatic weapons fire from the shore about 30 yards away. One 82-mm recoilless rifle round penetrated the engine compartment of PCF 79 causing minor damage and both craft were hit by numerous small caliber rounds. Three Navymen suffered minor wounds and one Viet Cong was killed by the return fire from the patrol craft.

On the evening of 22 April USCGC POINT MARONE fired on enemy structures and personnel 24 miles southwest of Bac Lieu (WR 498 005) with good effect. Expending 59 mortar rounds and 500 rounds of .50 caliber the cutter started three large fires, destroyed two structures, damaged one bunker and two structures, killed an estimated two Viet Cong and probably wounded three others.

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On the night of 14-15 April SEALs were inserted at the tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula (VQ 696 507) in order to capture a man from a village at VQ 699506 and patrolled for several hours without finding signs of habitation. Early on the morning of the 15th the team fired on two sampans after the occupants sighted the SEALs probing further down the coast. The two sampans were damaged and all five occupants were killed.

Enclosure (3)

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RIVER PATROL FORCE SUMMARY April 1969

GAME WARDEN forces continued operations throughout the Mekong Delta and the Rung Sat Special Zone. In addition to their major task of population and resources control along the major waterways, PBR's participated in random canal incursions, MEDCAPs, and psychological warfare operations. Units of the forces were also involved in special interdiction campaigns including GIANT SLINGSHOT, BARRIER REEF, TRAN HUNG DAO and Rach Gia. At the end of the month 70 PBR's were assigned to support TF 194 operations. The remaining 144 boats assigned to TF 116 supported normal GAME WARDEN operations and those portions of the interdiction campaigns that came under the operational control of CTF 116. These expanded operations, which necessitated the relocation of some patrol craft from the major Delta waterways, brought about a re-alignment of forces which occurred on 20 April. The new structure was as follows: TG 116.1 - Lower Bassac Patrol Group; TG 116.3 - Central Delta Patrol Group; TG 116.5 -Upper Delta Patrol Group; and TG 116.9 - RSSZ Patrol Group. Examples of the employment of the assigned task groups are given below.

Task Group 116.1 conducted evaluation and indoctrination of RUDD (Remote Underwater Detection Device) in the Bassac River, quick reaction operations, as contingencies arose, utilizing Kinh Phong Regional Forces, interdiction patrols and support of Kien Giang Province operations in the Rach Gia area, intensive evaluation of STAB (Strike Assault Boats)

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using these recently delivered ISSC's (Light SEAL Support Graft) on patrols of restricted Bassac tributaries, support of sector sweeps, and intensified patrols of the Can Tho crossing to provide better coverage of this critical area.

Task Group 116.3 units supported U. S. Ninth Infantry Division LRRP (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols) operations in interdicting suspected commo-liaison routes and in establishing anti-infiltration positions along the My Tho River, supported random PBR/PRU operations utilizing Ben Tre PRU organization reacting to tactical intelligence, and joined with the National Maritime Police for a combined blockade of Thoi Son Island from 0600-1700 on 28 April.

Task Group 116.5 units conducted joint USN/VNN operations in the Upper Mekong/Bassac region concentrating on infiltration interdiction from Base Area 704 (located in Cambodi in the region where the Mekong crosses the border), conducted border patrol operations with two PBR's on station continuously in the vicinity of Tan Chau District of Chau Duc Province to prevent inadvertent border crossings by U. S. personnel and craft, and on 28 April commenced a five day incursion/patrol of Tri Ton Canal for the purpose of interdicting crossings, monitoring waterborne traffic and training USN and ACTOV personnel in live firing PBR ambush tactics.

Task Group 116.7 (disestablished on 20 April) units provided night cover patrol for a dredge located near Vinh Long (XS 042 342), conducted support operations with the U. S. Ninth Division, and employed RUDD on

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night ambushes across known Viet Cong infiltration routes from Base Area 470 (located in Dinh Tuong Province).

Task Group 116.9 units provided support for PRU, SEAL, and RF company operations and continued to conduct USN/VNN operations to ensure safe passage of free world shipping in the Long Tau Channel to Saigon.

On 19 April Light Attack Squadron FOUR (VAL-4) became operational.

Utilizing OV-10A's, the squadron consists of two detachments of five aircraft each, positioned at Vung Tau (TE 194.9.8.2) in support of GIANT SLINGSHOT operations and Binh Thuy (TU 116.8) supporting GAME WARDEN operations. Commanding Officer VAL-4 assumed the designator CTG 116.4.

These 10 aircraft were supplemented by a maintenance pool of four aircraft at Binh Thuy.

On 9 April, the Navy Unit Commendation was awarded to USS GARRETT COUNTY (LST 786), USS HARNETT COUNTY (LST 821), USS HUNTERDON COUNTY (LST 838), and USS JENNINGS COUNTY (LST 846) for their meritorious service from 10 November 1966 to 30 January 1968 and from 1 March 1968 to 30 September 1968 while serving as Mobile Support Bases for GAME WARDEN forces.

PBR's accounted for over 2,500 two-boat patrols during April.

Detections, inspections, and boardings increased appreciably over last month's totals standing at 27,306, 50,582 and 70,838 respectively.

The UH-1B and OV-10A aircraft assigned to GAME WARDEN forces accumulated 310 hours in pre-planned strikes, 53 hours in reaction strikes, 208 hours

Enclosure (4)

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on targets of opportunity and 183 hours on support strikes for a total of 754 hours of combat.

PBR, UH-1B, and OV-10A GAME WARDEN Operations

Two PBR's escorting YLLC-5 on the afternoon of 1 April came under mortar and automatic weapons fire 13 miles southwest of My Tho (XS 300 383). The units immediately returned fire and were joined by two Seawolves who had been on a routine patrol. After repeated coordinated firing runs by the PBR's and Seawolves the enemy fire was suppressed. Troops from Ham Long Sub Sector who were operated in the area subsequently conducted a sweep through the ambush area and found that seven Viet Cong had been killed in the fire fight. There were no friendly casualties.

Seawolves on a routine My Tho patrol in the early evening of 8 April received clearance to place strikes on an estimated platoon of Viet Cong located 8 miles west of Truc Giang (XS 378 323). Moderate to heavy small arms fire was received from the area during the strikes. One secondary explosion resulted from a Seawolf .50 caliber hit. Enemy casualties were estimated as 10 Viet Cong probably killed and an additional four wounded. There were no U. S. casualties.

Just before 1800 on 9 April, PBR's 756 and 842 came under enemy fire while transiting the Dong Tran Canal, $15\frac{1}{2}$ miles southeast of Saigon (YS 092 740). Both boats were operating at top speed and were on opposite sides of the canal when four B-40 rockets were fired at them from the north bank. Only the second rocket scored a hit when it penetrated the gun tub



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and killed the forward gunner on PBR 756 which had been traveling along the north bank. PBR 842 moved from the south bank to the enemy firing position and reconned the area. At this point 842 came under automatic weapons fire from both banks and received damage. As a Navy LHFT was being scrambled to their assistance, the two PBR's reversed course and made another firing run through the Viet Cong positions. Additional PBR's then arrived on the scene to escort the damaged boats back to Nha Be. The LHFT, after placing strikes in the area, remained to provide cover for a planned insertion of PRU's. The PRU insertion was cancelled, however, due to approaching darkness and the lack of a safe landing zone. The LHFT then placed an additional strike on the enemy positions. Once all units were clear of the area, Army artillery commenced to saturate the probable enemy positions. After the barrage, a VNN LSSL fired 3-inch H and I fire into the suspected positions for almost an hour. Enemy casualties were unknown. Friendly casualties were one USN killed and three wounded; one VNN riding in the PBR's was also wounded.

Late on the morning of 24 April, OV-10A's of TU 115.4.8 placed a strike on a target-of-opportunity enemy position approximately 7 miles southeast of Sa Dec. During the attack no enemy fire was received and there were no U. S. casualties. Enemy casualties were listed as two Viet Cong probably killed and six wounded. Enemy material casualties were six structures and seven bunkers destroyed and three structures damaged.

PBR's on patrol in the RSSZ, 21 miles southeast of Saigon (YS 217 715),

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observed a sampan with three occupants at 2100 on 25 April. The sampan attempted to evade after warning shots had been fired and was taken under fire. One of the Viet Cong were killed and the other two captured. The sampan was subsequently destroyed and one AK-47 captured. There were no U. S. casualties.

"Swift" Boat Game Warden Operations

During April the number of "Swift" boats on patrol of the lower

Ham Luong and Co Chien rivers was increased from two to three in order

to provide better coverage of these heavily traveled waterways. At

the beginning of the month the PCF patrol on the Soi Rap was shifted

to the Vam Co until the 7th when this area was taken over by PBR's.

Swift boats on river patrols in normal GAME WARDEN areas detected 9,075

craft, of which 2,622 were inspected and 4,905 were boarded. While

operating on the rivers the PCF's carried out 58 gunfire support missions

and participated in 15 ground operations by traveling up adjoining canals

and rivers to insert, support, and extract troops. Included in the naval

gunfire missions are three cases of hostile fire suppression. No friendly

losses resulted from these encounters. Enemy losses to the Swift boat

operations totaled three killed (body count), two wounded, 15 craft destroyed

and one captured, 18 structures destroyed, and 25 structures damaged.

On the night of the 6th, PCF 54 carried out harassment and interdiction fire on a suspected Viet Cong concentration 18 miles up the Ham Luong River. Firing 30 rounds from her 81-mm mortar the Swift boat killed one and wounded two Viet Cong.

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On 28 April Co Chien River patrol units participated in a sweep by the 246th RF Company along the Khen Thuyen River. The troops were picked up by PCF's 56, 57 and 95 at Ap Thuan An (XR 656 959) and taken about 4 miles up the Khen Thuyen to XR 774924. During preparation fire on the landing area and while engaging targets of opportunity upon leaving the river the three Swifts destroyed 12 structures/bunkers, damaged another 38, destroyed eight sampans, and damaged one other sampan.

SEAL Operations

On 1 April, five SEALs and 10 PRU's were inserted by sampan 4 miles northeast of Sa Dec (WS 901 389) on a reconnaissance mission. Proceeding 300 meters up a canal they captured one Viet Cong and one Viet Cong suspect. Leaving three PRU's to guard the prisoners the remainder of the group continued on up the canal where they began a house search. While taking two captives from one house they observed a man evading into a canal. He was taken under fire. The SEALs then came under small arms and automatic weapons fire from both banks of the canal and the treeline. In the ensuing firefight, three Viet Cong in one of the houses were killed. Seawolves were scrambled and the SEALs broke contact and proceeded down the canal for extraction by LCPL. The Seawolves then placed a strike on the enemy positions. There were no friendly casualties. Enemy casualties were four Viet Cong killed with an additional three listed as probably killed, three captured and one suspect detained.

PBR's inserted a SEAL team 16 miles south of Saigon (XS 876 619) on

Enclosure (4)
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with weapons were observed moving northeast past the rear of the SEAL position. The Viet Cong spotted the SEAL rear security and evaded into a treeline where four additional Viet Cong were observed. The SEALs then moved south where they came under enemy fire from the northeast and northwest. As they continued to move south under fire, additional enemy fire was received from the southeast. RSSZ TOC was requested to scramble a Slick for extraction. A Navy LHFT was also scrambled and placed strikes around the SEAL perimeter. Having suppressed the enemy fire, the LHFT provided cover for the SEALs as they moved to the PBR rendezvous point where they were safely extracted. The additional assets sent by RSSZ TOC assisted in placing H and I fire into the suspected enemy positions. There were no friendly casualties: Enemy casualties were two killed by the SEALs and three probably killed by the LHFT.

On the evening of 23 April; SEALs, PRU's and two LDNN's were inserted by truck, 13 miles northwest of My Tho. They moved northeast and set a security position at a house near a primary PRU objective. At 0315, they received heavy small arms fire from the area west of the house. They returned and suppressed the enemy fire. One SEAL received slight shrapnel wounds and a MEDEVAC was ordered. The group patrolled south under cover of gunships and the dust off was completed. Friendly casualties were one Navyman wounded, one PRU killed and two PRU's wounded. Six Viet Cong were killed in the encounter.

Enclosure (4)

A team of SLAIs with two Hoi Chanhs, reacting to intelligence provided by the Hoi Chanhs, departed Can Tho late on the afternoon of 29 April. At their first stop the SEALs waited at a hootch (WR 823 954) while the Hoi Chanhs walked on to a market to pick up two females who were supposedly Viet Cong Medics. At 1800 the Hoi Chanhs returned with the suspects and the entire group moved by truck to Cai Tac Village Police Station (WR796 977). From here the Hoi Chanhs set out for their second target where they observed two males in a hootch and a third man moving 105-mm artillery rounds to a cache site. They took the third man under fire and killed him and received fire from the hootch. The Hoi Chanhs withdrew taking four 105-mm rounds with them. A third target had to be aborted when it was learned that friendly operations were being conducted in the area. The group remained overnight at the police station and the next morning, at 0730, the Hoi Chanhs set out for the Cai Tac market in search of three VCI members. At 0830 they returned with the three suspects. The original two detainers from the first stop were released when it was decided that they had been set up for capture after having wronged the Viet Cong. The remaining detainees and the captured rounds were subsequently taken to Can Tho. There were no friendly casualties.

Enemy Atta ks on Merchant Vessels

During the month, there was a dramatic decrease in the number of attacks on allied merchant vessels on the Long Tau. Only four such incidents occurred throughout the month. Three of these, 5 April against SS BUCYRUS VICTORY, 15 April against the Vietnamese merchant ship PHU QUOC, and 29

Enclosure (4)





April against SS PARSIDENT PIRRCE missed their targets. The USAS PERSEUS was hit on 27 April but only minor material damage resulted. In all instances there was immediate allied response to the attacks which was instrumental in suppressing additional fire.

Enclosure (4)

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RIVERINE ASSAULT FORCE SUMMARY April 1969

Naval units of the Mobile Riverine Force participated in operations which were characteristically diversified as to type of mission and area of employment during April. Reconnaissance in force, search and destroy, patrol, ambush, troop lift, inspection, Eagle Float, fire support, blocking force, escort and psyops duties were carried out by river assault craft often in conjunction with U. S. Army or Vietnamese forces as they operated from the GIANT SLINGSHOT Campaign area (the northern most area of Navy involvement in the Delta region) to the southern most reaches of the Cau Mau Peninsula (SILVER MACE II Campaign). The long term riverine assault operations in Kien Hoa Province continued as the combined Army/Navy units again inflicted severe losses on the enemy.

The following table indicates the distribution and employment of river assault craft on a typical day in April:

	ACTIVITY/OPERATION	g ret	81.	est . ·	3 6 12	er V	e grade a c	. •
ų, š		ASPB	ATC			REFUEL		3
	2nd Brigade, U.S. 9th Infantry Division	12	200	9		. 1	63	3
	Operation GIANT SLING- SHOT/Barrier Reef					1		
	Operation SILVER MACE						29	to a
						ı.		
	Overhaul/Conversion/ Backfit	2	2	_	-	_	_4	*
(#)	TOTALS	40	91	17	9	4	161	
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The recurring danger of enemy swimmer/sapper activity against river craft was in evidence again this month as three mining incidents or attempts were recorded against MRF craft operating in Kien Hoa Province and enemy Base Area 480. On 22 April, while transiting enemy Base Area 480 enroute to the MRB after completion of Operation SILVER MACE II, RAD 132 assault craft were engaged in an enemy initiated firefight on the Song Cai Tu 82 miles southwest of Vi Thanh (WR 420 756). During the action a watermine exploded 60 feet off the starboard bow of CCB-132-1 and caused minor flooding which was brought under control. Potential disaster was averted on 24 April when a Viet Cong command detonated mine was discovered attached to the anti-swimmer net of API-26 between the bow and pontoon. The homemade mine, weighing approximately 150-175 pounds, was discovered at 0730. Fish floats were seen attached to the barrier while it was being raised prior to getting underway; inspection by EOD personnel revealed the mine with the detonator lead severed. Speculation was that the detonator wire was cut during a minesweep patrol by a base defense boat. Lastly, ASPB-132-3 was sunk on 29 April on the Cai Tu River as an enemy mine of unknown type was detonated beneath its stern during the operation in enemy Base Area 480 in Chuong Thien Province. A second ASPB, 132-1 was damaged as a result of the explosion. (This incident is described in the SEA LORDS section under Operations in Enemy Base Area 480.) The sunken ASPB was already hauled up on a beach by 30 April as the timely salvage operations continued.

Enclosure (5)





Salvage operations on Monitor III-1 which was sunk as a result of battle damage on the Vam Co Tay River, 42 miles northwest of Moc Hoa were completed on 20 April and the craft was towed to Nha Be. The extensive repairs necessary are estimated to require use of out of country facilities. The monitor had sunk on 31 May,

River Assault Division 92 commenced six days of training for Vietnamese Navy boat crews on 28 April under the Accelerated Turnover Program (ACTOV). This training is in connection with a scheduled incremental turnover of RAC to the VNN in June.

Loudspeaker psyops broadcasts were an important aspect of RAC activity as tapes were played in all operating areas, at times during insertion/extraction of troops and immediately after firefights.

TASK GROUP 117.1 Operations

The concerted efforts of the MRF in Kien Hoa Province and ljacent areas again resulted in a record number of enemy casualties as aggressive search and destroy tactics accounted for 1155 Viet Cong killed during April. Side thrusts of a few days duration were also made by MRF forces into Go Cong and Vinh Binh Provinces during the month.

Enemy initiated activity during April diminished somewhat as hostile fire incidents directed against TG 117.1 RAC were encountered on eight occasions as compared to 21 such incidents last month. U. S. Navy casualties during these actions were 27 wounded.

River assault craft of River Assault Divisions (RAD) 131, 132, and

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151 supported the 3/47th, 4/47th, 3/60th and 6/31th Infantry battalions of the U. S. Army Ninth Division at various times throughout the month as assault landings were conducted along numerous rivers and canals throughout the operating area. RAD 92 as utility division provided frequent escort services, supported the 3/34th Artillery Battalion at fire support bases and commenced ACTOV training with the VNN. RAD 152 acted as base defense division. On 25 April RAD 131 relieved RAD 111 in the GIANT SLINGSHOT area.

On 2 April, nine RAC of RAD 131 (with one company each of 4/47th & 3/60 infantry and the headquarters company of the 3/34 Artillery embarked) were engaged in an enemy initiated firefight on the Rach Mo Cay, 13 miles south of My Tho (XS 468 206) while escorting 3/34th artillery barges. About eight B-40 rockets and heavy automatic weapons were fired at the boats resulting in one rocket hit each on Monitor 151-1 and ATH 131-12 and minor material damage. Fire was immediately returned and suppressed by the boat column and LHFT overhead. Nine Navymen were wounded (all minor); one soldier was killed and four were wounded in the attack. Enemy casualties were one killed with other results of suppressive fire unknown.

Seven RAD 92 units, eng 3ed primarily in fire support base (FSB) security operations during April, were enroute on 16 April from the mobile riverine base at Dong Tam to FSB Khan when they received five recoilless rounds from the south bank of the Song Ben Tre, 8 miles southeast of My Tho (XS 532 313) at 0935. Monitor 92-1 and Refueler 112-1 were

Enclosure (5)

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hit by one round each wounding three sailors. All units returned and suppressed the fire. The refueler was carrying Mogas in the well-deck; this was ignited and the boat became engulfed in flames. The blazing boat was immediately beached and the crew evacuated to ATC's 92-7 and 92-3. Firing commenced immediately and was aided by the quick arrival of additional equipment and firefighting foam flown to the scene by an Army helo. The fire was extinguished at 1115. An Army LHFT came on station immediately and Army 1st Air Cavalry troops arrived within 10 minutes to provide security for salvage operations. The boat was towed to Dong Tam for repairs.

On 26 April ATC's 152-7 and 152-13, while on base defense patrol, sighted a total of five persons at two locations on the south bank of the My Tho River (XS 383 406 and XS 400 407) two miles southwest on Dong Tam. The Viet Cong were spotted in a free fire zone with a night observation device. The RAC took the Viet Cong under fire resulting in two probable kills.

Enclosure (5)



MARKET	(2) TIME		Mobile Riverine	(4) Force
Service, pair option from the Committee of the Committee		11111111111	MODILO ILLYOTLIO	10100
Inspections 26 Boardings 10 Craft detained Persons detained Viet Cong suspects Hostile fire incidents	0,402 6,902 0,149 (5) 960 54 36	235,742 52,960 75,436 (5) 1,483 36	(5) (5) (5) 103 (5)	
Enemy casualties: a. Killed 23 BC + 30) EST	38 BC	1,155	
b. Woundedc. Captured		24 BC+2 PROB 7	(5)	» a
USN casualties:	•		Section 1	į
a. Killed b. Wounded c. Captured	0 4 0	5 0	2 45 0 1	
d. Missing Enemy material losses:	U	0	1	ត្ត សភ
a. Destroyed:				4
(1) Junks or sampans (2) Structures b. Captured:	127 186	51 225	(5) 40	, ",
(1) Junks or sampans	6	2	(5)	
(2) Weapons	0	3 rifles/	171	
(3) Ammunition (rounds)	0	2 grenades 0	1 500	
(4) Rice (tons) c. Damaged:	0	0	1,500 1	
(1) Junks or sampans (2) Structures	40 232	39 167	(5) (5)	
USN material losses:	~		(2)	
a. Destroyed:				3 ,
(1) Surface craft(2) Helicopters	0	0	(5)	
b. Damaged:			122	
(1) Surface craft	3	2	8	
(2) Helicopters SAR missions	0	1	(5)	
DATE HITSSTOLIS				

Remarks: (

(1) Statistics include only "Standard" Task Force Operations.

Operation SEA LORDS statistics not included, see SEA LORDS
Statistical Summary.

(2) Includes SEA TIGER Operations.

. (3) Includes "Swift" boat patrols in GAME WARDEN area of operation.

(4) Includes TF 117 and Base Area 480 operations; additional MRF statistics included in SEA LORDS Campaign Statistics.

(5) Information not available or not applicable.

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals Declassified after 12 years DECLASSIFIED Enclosure (6)

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NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP April 1969

<u>Vietnamese Navy</u>

Developments in the Accelerated Turnover Program (ACTOV) and re-lated projects that are designed to increase the role of the Vietnamese Navy moved smoothly forward in April. Aside from some minor equipment problems and the lack of a technical English vocabulary, the VN PBR the street of th trainees have performed well in active patrols. The enthusiastic and eager sailors are quickly learning proper procedures for firing and clear-ing weapons, searching watercraft, and cleaning weapons. The USCG WBB's POINT GARNET and POINT LEAGUE sailed for MARKET TIME patrols on 6 and 18 April, respectively, entirely manned by VNN personnel with the exception en andre elle 17 in die olimiter i stelle braile tot i terre delle e en die i of the Commanding Officer. Known as the SCATTOR Program (Small Craft Assets, Training, and Turnover of Resoures), VN sailors relieve their USCG counterparts on the WPB's one at a time until the entire crew except and the first that the first property is the case of the contract of the contract of the contract of the case of t for the Commanding Officer is manned by the VNN. The US Commanding Officers are relieved by a VNN counterpart when the boats are officially turned over to the Vietnamese Navy. to the common the common terms of the common t

With the exception of the night of 10 - 11 April, VNN confrontations with the enemy were light and scattered during the month. Almost completely avoiding any major contact with government forces, the enemy appeared to limit his activities to sporadic attacks by fire, minor ground probes, terrorist attacks, and increased mining attempts. While

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patroling an average of fourteen MARKET TIME stations, Fleet Command ships searched 6,593 junks and 23,497 people. Eleven of these junks and 41 people were detained. This represented increases of 49.2% and 44.5%. in comparison to the figures for March. During the month Fleet Command Units fired 61 NGFS missions. The LSSL's and LSIL's accounted for the majority of them while firing harrassment and interdiction missions into suspected VC locations along the Ham Luong , Co Chien, My Tho, and Hau Gian Rivers and in the Rung Sat Special Zone. In addition to the routine patrols conducted by the LSSL's and LSIL's in the Long Tan, My Tho, and Bassac Rivers, one ISSL and one ISIL, along with two LCM's and RAG 21/33 units, they provided troop lifts, logistic services, and NGFS for Operation SILVER MAGE II on the lower Cau Mau Peninsula. During routine sweeps of the Long Tau, Dong Nai and Saigon Rivers MLM's and LCMM's recovered electrical cable from their eweeping gear on three occasions and on 12 April two MLM's received small arms fire from the west bank of the Dong Nai River (Y\$ 045915) that resulted in two small holes in the bow of one boat:

VN PBR's of River Patrol Group 51 (RPG 51) were involved in nine incidents and fire fights during troop insertions and while engaged in the three daily and five nightly patrols on the Long Tau and Soirap Rivers. The PBR's accounted for six killed, four VC captured, and one VC who rallied. On 29 April two VN PBR's with VN Rangers embarked were conducting a reconnaissance mission with help escort ten miles southeast

Enclosure (7)

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of Saigon on the Ong Keo stream. After completing the mission, the PBR's started back to Dong Tranh when a mine detonated under the lead boat, initiating a heavy B-40 and B-41 rocket attack (YS 036782). The boat occupants were knocked down and the boat went out of control and proceeded ten meters inland before coming to rest. The cover boat medevaced the four VAN, six VN Rangers, and US Ranger advisor who were wounded to Mha Be. One Ranger was killed and the beached PBR was extensively damaged.

There were 67,943 junks and 214,918 people searched in April by Coastal Group units of all four Coastal Zones. This represented a 1.4% and 7.9% increase in comparison to the March statistics. Detainments increased from 80 to 181 junks and from 646 to 941 persons. The first three coastal zone junks were credited with 95% of the junks and 88% of the persons detained.

The Cua Dai River area remained the center of enemy activity for junks of the First Coastal Zone. On the morning of 11 April Coastal Group (CG) 14 units were sweeping Thuan Thinh Island (BT 170550) when they engaged the enemy. Three VC were killed and one VC was captured. Late in the afternoon the coastal group conducted another insertion (BT 182550) on the island and this time one VC was killed. On 18 April CG 34 units inserted four RF companies and one ARVN eleven miles south of Ben Tre on the Ham Luong River (XS 600130, 630150, 600190) on three different occasions. While the ground forces swept the area, the junks

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acted as a blocking force on the adjacent river. During the day the combined force accounted for twenty one VC killed, twenty one VC captured, and two suspected VC detained. Several personal weapons, two short wave radios, and some medical supplies were uncovered. The VN sailors were credited with one VC killed and four VC captured (included in total) and the destruction of three enemy sampans.

Patrolling six miles south of their base camp (CQ 155777) on 27

April, CG 23 junks spotted two people on the beach who ran and hid in

the nearby rocks after being sighted. Responding to the VN call for fire
support, U.S. PCF 49 jointed with the VN units to place machine-gun fire
on the beach. A VN landing party went ashore and found one VC and trails
of three others who were wounded. Several rifles, a quantity of rice
and medicine, two satchel charges and some miscellaneous pieces of cloth
were confiscated.

In operation Tran Hung Dao an average of two VN PCF's and ten

Fourth Coastal Zone junks patroled the Rach Giang Thanh and Vinh Te Canal from

Ha Tien to a point twenty miles upstream (VS 690629). Reaction troops,

junks, LDNN, U.S. Seals, and TF 116 PBR's carried out ambush patrols and

sweeping operations south from Chau Doc. There were several small

skirmishes and fire fights during the month but generally routine patrols

were the order of the day.

In the Third and Fourth Riverine areas VNN River Assault Groups (RAG's) were involved in troop lifts, amphibious operations, convoy

Enclosure (7)
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escorts, blocking missions, Psyops, civic action, medevacs, and fire support. From 21 - 25 April RAG 28, U.S. Army, and local troops conducted river control operations on the Saigon River twelve to twenty five miles northwest of the capital city (from XT 750176 to XT 53)366). Enemy forces, utilizing a combination of B-40 rockets, mortar, small arms and one command detonated water mine, initiated fire fights on four separate occasions. Two U.S. advisors, three U.S. soldiers, two VM sailors, and one civilian were wounded during these incidents. One of the seven VC killed by friendly forces had in his possession an order to stop the VMN units in the area.

River Assault and Interdiction Divisions 70 and 71 (RAID 70 and 71) continued to improve their effectiveness in GIANT SLING SHOT Operations on the Vam Co Dong and Vam Co Tay Rivers. On 24 April the tactical area from Tan An up the Cam Co Tay to Moc Hoa was assigned to RAID 70 and the RAID commander assumed CTU 194.9.3. This new responsibility involved a shift in the RAID assets. RAID 70 was assigned six ASPB's five ATC's, one monitor, and one CCB at Tan An and two ASPB's, three ATC's, and one monitor at Tuyen Nhon. RAID 71 has four ASPB's, three ATC's and one monitor at Ben Luc and four ASPB's and two ATC's at Tra Cu. The VN recorded nineteen fire fights initiated by the enemy and eight initiated by Vietnamese forces in GIANT SLING SHOT Operations. Coordinated operations with RAID's were responsible for 92 VC killed, ten VC and three suspected VC captured. Friendly forces operating with the VNN suffered

Enclosure (7)





four killed and twenty-one wounded. The RAID's had only three wounded.

Vietnamese Marine Corps

There was light to moderate enemy activity reported by the Vietnamese Marines in April resulting from operations conducted in III and IV CTZ.

Brigade A, comprised of the Brigade Headquarters, the Third

Infantry Battalion, and Battery A of the VNMC. Artillery Battalion, continued reconnaissance in force and tank - infantry operations in Binh

Duong Province (approx. XT 580150) under the operational control of the 5th

ARVM Division. Several light and scattered combat incidents accounted

for sixteen VC killed and three captured at the expense of three VN

Marines killed and another twenty wounded.

On 7 April Brigade B, including Brigade Headquarters, the Fourth and Sixth Infantry Battalions, and Battery B of the VNMC Artillery

Battalion, commenced riverine/reconnaissance in force operations entitled SILVER MACE II in Nam Can and Dan Doi Districts of An Xuyen Province within the control of the 21st ARVN Division. While utilizing the U.S.

RAC's and PCF's and VN RAG boats for transportation on the Cua Lon and Bo De Rivers, the Marines Sought out the enemy throughout the tactical area. Upon conclusion of the operation on 18 April, the Marines accounted for eighteen VC killed and twelve confirmed VC and 19 suspected VC taken into custody. A large number of bunkers, structures, and sampans were destroyed and several ammunition cashes were uncovered, confiscated or destroyed. Marine casualties were three killed and twenty-six wounded.

Enclosure (7)



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The Brigade stood down until 24 April when they moved into Kien Hung District of Chuong Thien Province for more riverine and reconnaissance in force operations. Activity for the remainder of the month was negligible to light.

The First Infantry Battalion relieved the Fourth Battalion on 12

April and remained with Brigade B through 30 April. The Fourth Battalion returned to its base camp at Vung Tau. On 23 April operational control changed to the Joint General Staff and the Fourth Battalion moved to

Thu Duc to act as a reserve unit and to conduct refresher training for the rest of the month.

The Second Infantry Battalion continued company size recommaissance operations for the 18th ARVN Division near Long Thanh (YS 140920) in Bien Hoa Province with negligible results. The battalion was put under the control of the Long Bien Special Zone and helolifted into a new operational area north of the Dang Nai River on 18 and 19 April. With artillery support from battery D the marines carried out recommaissance in force operations in the area for the rest of the month yielding negative contact. The VC had definitely been in the area as enemy mines killed two marines and wounded another twenty-six.

Security and reconnaissance missions were performed by the Fifth Battalion for the ARVN Airborn Division just north of Saigon with negative results for the entire month.

Battery C stood down at Thu Duc the first half of the month. On 15 April the artillery units moved into two fire support bases under the

Enclosure (7)

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control of the Rung Sat Special Zone. An artillery platoon from Thu

Duc base camp joined the other units of the battery on 28 April and the
entire battery provided gunfire support during the remaining days of

April.

Battery D, operating under the control of the Capital Military District had platoons stationed in Saigon at Newport Beach, Cat Lai, and Thu Duc. The platoon at the Newport Bridge detached to the Second Battalion for operations in the Long Bien Special Zone from 18 - 30 April.

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VNN/VNMC STATISTICAL SUMMARY April 1969

VIETNAMESE NAVY:							
	Daily Av	CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY.	- transporters	ched	Detai		
01 95 P 8 961	Oper -	Empl	Junks	People	Junks	People	
COASTAL FORCE	50.6	49.1	19,316	70,885	66	418	
III III	46.0 52.6 42.1	45.2 50.8 42.1	32,412 8,636 7,579	90,910 27,730 25,393	47 59 9	261 149 113	
	Sub-tota	ls:	67,943	214,918	181	941	
*FLEET COMMAND PATROL SHIPS	41.7	29.1	6,593	23,497	11	41	
RIVERINE AREA RAG CRAFT RAIDS	117.5	116.8	6,360 172	23,660 470	0	l o	
#GEN RESERVE FORCE	72.7	64.7	5,441	18,008	_3	_5	3
	TOTA	L:	86,509	280,553	195	988	
VIETNAMESE MARINI	E CORPS:						
VC/NVA	KIA:	<u>144</u>	Captured:	29	Suspects	detained:23	
VNMC	KIA:	14	WIA:	85 MI	A: 0		

^{*} Provided 61 gunfire support missions

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[#] Includes RAG 27, RTEG and RFG 51

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PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CIVIC ACTION SUMMARY April 1969

The U. S. and Vietnamese Navy accounted for 25 Hoi Chanhs in April.

Four of these, including one NVA regular, rallied to GIANT SLINGSHOT forces. SEA LORDS operations in the Ca Mau Peninsula area were given partial credit for the increase in rallies to the Nam Can district capital from seven in March to 13 in April.

Interrogation of Hoi Chanhs and POW indicated that almost all of them had been exposed to U. S. or government PsyOps programs. Fear, hunger, personal hardships, and disillusionment with the enemy cause were common reasons for rallying to the government cause.

Sniper attacks on the PsyOps and Medcap teams and the Viet Congs' own Chieu program are indicative of the devastating effect that PsyOps is having on the enemy's effort. The Viet Cong have published a Chieu Hoi leaflet and have gone so far as to accept Hoi Chanhs back into heir ranks if they renounce their mistakes.

Both PsyOps and Medcap operations were well received in April. The Navy Medcap program alone treated approximately 25,000 Vietnamese. The Vietnamese always gathered in large crowds to hear the loudspeaker broadcasts and to receive the wide variety of PsyOps material including food, newspapers, magazines, Chieu Hoi leaflets, soaps and cooking oils.

The Naval Support Activity at Danang reported that there were 174 self-help projects underway and that significant progress had been made

Enclosure (9)
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USN CIVIC ACTION STATISTICAL SUMMARY (1) MARCH 1969

	TOTAL NUMBER OF MAN-DAYS PERSONNEL OF UNITS ENGAGED IN CIVIC
	ACTION PROJECTS: 4083
	and the control of th
	COST OF SUPPLIES CONTRIBUTED BY MILITARY RESOURCES FOR CIVIC
	ACTION PROJECTS: VN\$ 6,470,980
	VOLUNTARY CONTRIBTIONS VN\$ 414,872
	DEDCEMPACE OF IL C MILITEADY CHARACTER ACTION ACTION
	PERCENTAGE OF U. S. MILITARY CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED
	Other FWMAF
	RVNAF 30
	U.S. Civilian voluntary-agencies 3
	Average percent of self-help by VN civilians 80
	ROGRAMS
	Man Days Expenditures (VN\$)
	Economic Development 399 160,732
	Education 598 802,850
	Social Welfare 2,452 6,054,838
	Transportation 295 245,027 Refugee 339 1.87,035
	Refugee 339 487,035
	NSTITUTES ASSISTED:
•	Number
	Schools 17
	Hospitals/Dispensaries 24
	Orphanages 20
	Others 71

NOTE: (1) Statistics shown are those for March; see paragraph two of transmittal letter.

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Enclosure (10)

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