

CNO

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

Monthly
Historical
Summary



CONFIDENTIAL

JUL 1971

013458
DECLASSIFIED
4/10
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
U.S. NAVAL FORCES, VIETNAM
FPO SAN FRANCISCO, 96626

FF5-16/N-4114

5750

Ser: 01026


12 September 1971

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam
To: Distribution List

Subj: U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam Monthly Historical Summary
for July 1971.

1. The U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam Monthly Historical Summary
is forwarded for information and retention.



J. P. TRAVERS
By direction

NAVFORV/NAVADVGRP/MACV NOTE C5216 of 1 May 1971

List I M, K, GG Case I
List II A(4), B
List III A, B
List IV A, B, C
List V A
List VI A

Distribution
Copy to:

CINCPACFLT (4)
COMUSMACV (Doctrine Branch- J-343,
Hist. Branch-SJS, COC, JOD, J3-12,
Office Management Division, MAC-AM)
CNO (OP-09B9[3], OP-09B91E, OP-03,
04, 05, 06, 34, 92, Ops. Eval.Group)
OPNAV (OP-601V)
CINCLANTFLT
COMFIRSTFLT
COMSECONDFLT
COMSIXTHFLT
COMSEVENTHFLT

DECLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

013458
H-10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

CHNAVMAT (Code 04)
COMSEVENTHFLT (Hist. Team)
PRES NAVWARCOL
COMPHIBLANT
COMCBPAC
COMCBLANT
COMINEWARFOR
COMDT AFSC
Commandant, U.S. Army War College (Attn: Library U-393)
COMNAVFACENCOM
SUPT USNA
CHINFO
CO NAVPHIBSCOL LCREEK
CO NAVPHIBSCOL CORONADO
PHIBTRADET MARIS
NSRDC PANFLA
NIOTC MARIS
Project Manager, Naval Inshore Warfare Project
CHNAVSEC C&GS COL
CHNAVSEC Air University (Attn: AUL (SE) 69-10)
USA SPECWARSCOL (Attn: USN/MC Liaison Officer)
USMC Rep., USA Infantry School
DIA (DIAAP 4A2/Pentagon)
COMNAVSHIP R&D CEN
COMNAVORDSYSCOM (ORD-08)
COMNAVSPECWARGRU, ATLANTIC
COMNAVSPECWARGRU, NSAS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMANDER

U.S. NAVAL FORCES

VIETNAM

MONTHLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY

July 1971

Force Historian..... LCDR Edward F. Sienicki
Field Historians.....LCDR George C. Womble
LT William Y. Frentzel, II
LT Barnaby S. Ruhe
Historical Journalist..... JO2 Don H. Stephenson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Table of Contents

FOREWORD

CURRENT OPERATIONS

NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP SUMMARY

Task Fleet 21

TRAN HUNG DAO II

TRAN HUNG DAO IV

TRAN HUNG DAO V

TRAN HUNG DAO VI

TRAN HUNG DAO VIII

TRAN HUNG DAO IX

TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII

TRAN HUNG DAO XIX

TRAN HUNG DAO XX

TRAN HUNG DAO XXI

Rung Sat Special Zone

CTF 211

CTF 212

CTF 214

RIVER ASSAULT GROUPS

SPECIAL WARFARE

CTG 116.7

CTG 116.8

COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCES (COASTAL ZONES)

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION SUMMARY

ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SUMMARY

NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SAIGON

NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- APPENDIX I - Task Fleet 21/22 Organization
- APPENDIX II - COMNAVFORV/CHNADVGRP Organization
- APPENDIX III - CHNAVADVGRP Task and Advisory Organization
- APPENDIX IV - Glossary of Abbreviations

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREWORD

Enemy activity remained low throughout the Delta for the second straight month, as the guerrillas continued to refit and resupply, and attempted to increase their strength at the grass roots level in preparation for the GVN elections coming up next month. Contact with the enemy was nil in three TRAN HUNG DAO AOs, and was very light in four others. Two AOs showed light to moderate enemy activities, TRAN HUNG DAO II and IV, with the former leading the way with seven firefights and 22 enemy KIA recorded. In addition, the restructuring of operations continued in the Delta as the combined TRAN HUNG DAO X/XVII campaigns were disestablished and the same territory incorporated under a new campaign, TRAN HUNG DAO XXI, under the OPCON of CTF 210, on 1 July. Also, vital POL continued to reach the Cambodian capital in an ever increasing supply, as the number of ships per convoy was doubled during the month.

Cloud units significantly enhanced the effectiveness of TRAN HUNG DAO XV Inner Barrier operations throughout the month. The Clouds were highly mobile task units patrolling in high infiltration threat areas in all four coastal zones. The units were functioning smoothly by the end of the month, despite early coordination problems

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

brought about by inexperienced OTCs. The Task Unit 213.3.1, operating off of the Long Toan, Thanh Phu, and Binh Dai VC Secret Zones of the Third Coastal Zone was particularly successful as its U.S. Navy Seawolf assets consistently found daylight enemy targets.

During July, Vietnamization slowed somewhat as only one significant item was turned over to the Vietnamese, the ACTOVRAD station at Vung Tau. U.S. Navy in-country strength continued to decrease, reaching 10,398 men on 31 July, a reduction of about 500 men over last month's strength figures, a somewhat smaller monthly reduction than the preceding few months.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CURRENT OPERATIONS

VNN Designations

USN Designations

TRAN HUNG DAO II (TG 214.1)	GIANT SLINGSHOT
TRAN HUNG DAO IV (TG 214.2)	SOLID ANCHOR
TRAN HUNG DAO V (TG 216.1)	READY DECK
TRAN HUNG DAO VI (TG 212.5)	SEARCH TURN
TRAN HUNG DAO VII (TG 221.1)	SEA TIGER
TRAN HUNG DAO VIII (TG 217.1)	NONE
TRAN HUNG DAO IX (TG 212.3)	BARRIER REEF
TRAN HUNG DAO XV (TF 213)	MARKET TIME (Inner Barrier)
TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII (TF 218)	NONE
TRAN HUNG DAO XIX (TG 217.2)	NONE
TRAN HUNG DAO XX (TG 219.1)	NONE
TRAN HUNG DAO XXI (TF 210)	NONE
RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE (TF 228)	NONE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

TASK FLEET 21


During July, the accelerated overhaul program, instituted to get the young Vietnamese Navy back into top notch operational condition, began to bear fruit. There were problems however, such as the abandonment of boats at the overhaul sites by their crews, (the sailors saw this respite from combat as a chance for leave and liberty), the arrival of craft at the overhaul site in an unfit condition to begin overhaul, and finally, large backlogs of craft at LSB Dong Tam, Binh Thuy, and Nha Be, which were not part of the accelerated program.

On 1 July, TRAN HUNG DAO XVII which was combined with TRAN HUNG DAO X in June to form the largest naval AO in the Delta, was redesignated TRAN HUNG DAO XXI.

Cambodian POL convoys made only three trips to Phnom Penh during July as opposed to four in June; however, due to a new contract with the oil companies, twice as many ships were provided and double the amount of oil was convoyed to the Cambodian capital, easing the POL situation considerably.

The following pages illustrate the TRAN HUNG DAO AOs as of 31 July. In addition, TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV and XXV, scheduled to begin on 1 August are included.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~




CONFIDENTIAL




~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

031122A1030
DECLASSIFIED





CONFIDENTIAL





CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIF










DECLASSIFIED



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

TRAN HUNG DAO II

A revival in activity occurred during the month of July, as TRAN HUNG DAO II operations put the pinch on the enemy and they responded in kind. The enemy hit hard and often at the start of the month with five well coordinated boat ambushes resulting in extensive damage to one PBR. One VNN was killed, and one USN and four VNN were wounded. The actions occurred on the Vam Co Tay River in a 15 kilometer stretch between north/south grid lines 35 and 46. All allied casualties occurred in the 6 July ambush as 20 B-40 rockets were fired with good effect. Intelligence substantiated that the area was an enemy troop and weapons river crossing point, as well as a poorly coordinated VNN operational area. It is there that the river serves as a boundary for Military Regions Three and Four. In correcting this problem, TRAN HUNG DAO II operated for the last time on 31 July, as it split into TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV and XXV at that juncture of military regions.

The Seawolves of the AO again proved their great worth during the month, having killed 16 of the enemy, with 16 other probable kills, having prepped and covered for the numerous troop inserts of the month, and having struck over 40 times at

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

intelligence targets. They scrambled to assist units in trouble 13 times and, all in all, retained the great respect of the allies and VC alike.

The TIGHTJAW program continued to severely harass the enemy as he made infiltration attempts in the AO. From the various artillery sites in the AO, actuations, averaging four a night, were responded to with a 12 minute reaction time. The DUFFELBAG sensing devices also provided key intelligence of enemy movements for the selection of waterborne guardpost sites, as well as for troop inserts.

In an aggressive effort to strike a blow at enemy infiltration, and with the limited boat assets available, other forces were gathered for the newly devised hard-hitting operations. On 13 July a combined operation, utilizing Army Slick troop transport helos for the first time in the AO, was initiated in an area near the above mentioned enemy ambush sites at "VC Island" on the Vam Co Tay River. Another type of operation termed "Eagle Ops" was undertaken frequently during the month, again using the two new Slick assets, in an effort to bring the initiative back to the Allies. In the "Eagle Ops", a C&C helo flew with a reconnaissance aircraft to spot enemy movement, while GVN troops waited by Slicks on

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the ground for a fast reaction insert of opportunity.

By July 1971, the TRAN HUNG DAO II "Giant Slingshot" AO had quieted down considerably since December 1968 when the operation was begun, though its crucial mission remained to stop enemy supplies from being moved through the AO to the Kien Hoa and Saigon areas. In the second month of the "Giant Slingshot" operation, the number of engagements was on the average of three a day, while in July 1971 the activity was down to ten river engagements in the month. Both tallies were typical for their time. The phasedown in the AO was due to various factors: where there were 100 boats operating three years ago in the AO, there were in July 1971 only 66. Of these, 70 percent were generally up, and they were split between day and night patrols, patrolling in pairs. Thus 11 pairs of boats patrolled the 300 kilometers of river in the AO at any one time in July, which was clearly inadequate, and accounted somewhat for the diminished contact made with the enemy.

Starting with the incursions of May 1970, the GVN operations in Cambodia had apparently cut down markedly the enemy infiltration level through the TRAN HUNG DAO II AO. Another reduction in the area was that of the U.S. advisors, who by degrees were reduced from 26 original advisory units to five for RPDs and seven

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

for RIDs, this reduction corresponding directly to the increased ability of the Vietnamese to prosecute the war, both operationally and in the support arena. Indeed, at the Ben Luc Intermediate Support Base, the repair effectiveness reportedly was high, with advisor support minimal, in this the second year of ACTOV. Advisors rarely went out on patrols in the AO in July, and when they did so, it was to act as liaison between the VNN and US air assets.

The five ambushes occurring near "VC Island" on the Vam Co Tay River between the second and tenth of the month were infiltration motivated, as the enemy felt the pinch of increasing GVN pressure along that oft-used route. The first ambush occurred on 2 July at 1645H as two PBRs of RPD 64, enroute to Tuyen Nhon from Tan An, were taken under fire with B-40 rockets on two occasions. The first attack occurred nine miles northeast of Tuyen Nhon, and consisted of eight B-40 rockets from both banks of the river. All rockets missed their mark, while the PBRs made firing runs with unknown results. They then proceeded on and, 45 minutes later and three miles further up river, three more B-40 rockets were fired at them, with small arms fire as well. Again the PBRs were not hit, and the results of the PBRs response were unknown. Artillery was called in, as Seawolves could not respond, and fired on the respective targets at XS 435 745 and XS 377 787.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The third ambush involved three PBRs of RPD 64 enroute from MoBase II at Tan An, who were attacked six miles east of Tuyen Nhon at 1455H on the sixth, near XS 418 771. The enemy struck with 20 B-40 rockets and automatic weapons fire from two positions on the south bank, 200 meters apart. The three boats beached on the north bank opposite the ambush and returned fire. Seawolves from Dong Tam arrived at 1530H and placed strikes coordinated through the Ben Luc NOC. A squad of Tuyen Nhon District RF troops arrived at 1630H as a security force for the beached boats. The B-40s had found their marks on the PBRs, as one VNN was killed and four wounded, while one USN advisor was slightly wounded. One of the PBRs was heavily damaged. Enemy casualties were unknown. The next ambush occurred nine miles east of Tuyen Nhon on the tenth at 1823H when three PBRs of RPD 64 returning from Tan An were attacked with three B-40 rockets and automatic weapons fire from the south bank, near XS 434 745. The PBRs returned fire, aided by Seawolves that were called in, but the results were unknown. The Allies incurred no casualties. On the same day, the last in the series of five ambushes occurred, this time at XS 425 764, seven miles northeast of Tan An, as boats of RPD 54 in WBGPs were taken under fire with B-40

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

rockets at 2230H. This time the PBRs merely suppressed the fire and moved up the river two kilometers. The five attacks, occurring in the same area of heavy enemy infiltration, underlined the enemy determination to move supplies through the AO and his extant potential for a good fight.

Elsewhere in the AO the enemy presence was felt. On 1 July, while returning to ATSB Tra Cu from day patrol, a RAC of RID 44 was taken under fire with three B-40 rockets and AK-47 rounds from the east bank of the Vam Co Dong at XT 464 020. The engagement, lasting from five to ten minutes, had unknown casualties as the boat returned the fire at the estimated 25 attackers. Artillery fired on the area after contact, and Seawolves put in a strike at 2000H after the weather had cleared.

Two PBRs of RPD 54, in a drifting night ambush, were proceeding silently down the river in a position near XT 228 424, one half mile east of Ben Keo, when, at 0310H on 2 July, they detected a sampan crossing the Vam Co Dong without lights. The PBRs took the sampan under fire, killing a 40 year old man with an outdated I.D. card, and capturing a 14 year old boy.

On 13 July, the first of a new type of combined operation with

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

US Army Slicks began, when a force of seven " heavies", six PBRs, two Slicks, and four Seawolves, inserted 300 troops who swept the area in the vicinity of XS 445 720 at "VC Island", in response to the series of five ambushes that had occurred thereabouts during the first half of the month. Nearby, 35 PRUs were inserted by two Slicks with Seawolf coverage at XS 430 720, resulting in one of the enemy killed by air, and one sampan destroyed. The larger insert found the enemy making himself scarce.

On 19 July Detachment Four Seawolves on a routine patrol placed two machine gun/rocket attacks at XS 495 986 at 1824H and 1915H. Clearance was obtained through Tra Cu NOC when a DUFFELBAG activation indicated the presence of 75-100 enemy, and after positive sighting, and after receiving small arms fire. The results were unknown, as usual, but captured VC have substantiated the deadly effect of such missions.

Troop inserts were regular occurrences during the month, with the air cover proving itself as effective as the troops on the ground. "Eagle Ops" were conducted in Thu Thua District on targets of opportunity on the 20th, with uncertain results. On 21 July RID 44 inserted one RF company four kilometers south of

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Tra Cu, with telling results. The air cover was responsible for killing six VC, while the enemy killed eight RFs and wounded eight. On the same day there were multiple air inserts from "VC Island" west to north/south grid line 35, but the results were negative. The next day, 56 district troops were inserted by Slicks in an area north northeast of Ben Luc, with the Slicks accounting for the two enemy killed. On the 24th, RID 40 and 44 units inserted and blocked for 600 troops of the ARVN 25th Infantry in the vicinity of Tra Cu between points XS 490 985 and XS 530 930, but for obvious reasons the enemy evaded contact. Slicks and Seawolves commenced a three day operation of air insertions on the same day ten kilometers northwest of Ben Luc as part of the continuing effort to keep the enemy on the run vice running guns. The next day Black Ponies struck hard with four CBU bombs followed by LDNN air insert and an Army air insert at a point ten kilometers northwest of Ben Luc. The next morning, on 26 July, Seawolves of Detachment Four experienced a frustrating event when they scrambled at 0220H for two outposts being overrun near XT 430 110. They arrived over the target area with numerous tracer fire being received, but had to wait for clearance along with a C&C and a gun team. They orbited overhead until the Army gun team

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

expended their fuel, but the clearance was not forthcoming, even though they were coming under tracer fire and one outpost had a VC flag flying with people running around under a neon light. Navy Seawolves accomplished more in the AO at 2145H on the same day when they medevaced a Vietnamese woman from ATSB Tuyen Nhon, after she was accidentally shot in the abdomen by a VNN watch tower guard. The quick response of the Seawolves apparently prevented a serious incident between the ARVN and VNN as the Rangers had threatened to overrun the ATSB if no quick action was taken. The next day, at 1910H, the Seawolves of Detachment Four again had encouraging results, when they scrambled to cover Seals in contact with the enemy in the vicinity of XS 032 560, placed multiple strikes, and then later extracted the Seals. They received moderate small arms fire, and observed a secondary explosion, killing an estimated ten enemy personnel.

The enemy was persistently pursued during the month, as "Eagle Ops" were again conducted on 26 July, ten kilometers northwest of Ben Luc, while units of RID 44 inserted 300 troops north of Tra Cu at various locations. Two of the northern inserts, in the vicinity of the Tra Cu/Go Dau Ha boundary, were known infiltration routes. The next day the same units out of Tra Cu inserted 300 more RF troops at various locations in the Tra Cu AO.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On 30 July, a Slick insert of National Police started in Thu Thua, but when Ben Luc NOC gained a contact, the Slicks and Seawolves diverted. The results of the Ben Luc operation were one enemy killed by air, with four probably killed, while the Police accounted for two killed on the ground. One Vietnamese ally was killed, while three were wounded.

Two river ambushes occurred near Ben Luc on 30 July, with only minor damage inflicted on the craft. At 1620H, 20 miles west of Ben Luc, units of RPD 64 received four rounds of M-72 rockets while on a routine patrol. RFs were inserted in the area, around XS 336 788, and an EOD team arrived from Ben Luc to dislodge a rocket which was live and stuck in the hull of the craft. One hour later, but only five kilometers northwest of Ben Luc, four PBRs of RPD 53 came under B-41 and AK-47 fire from an unknown number of VC at XS 575 782. One boat took a B-41 rocket in the starboard bow. Detachment Four Seawolves arrived 12 minutes after being called to commence their strike.

A combined air/boat insert of Ben Luc District troops on the last day of the month finally uncovered the elusive enemy, resulting in five killed and five weapons captured, while four of the allies

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

were killed and ten wounded. Later that day at 1715H, and in the same vicinity, XS 577 782, two PBRs received three B-41 rocket rounds, to no effect. Seawolves later put in a strike, and the boats reset their waterborne guardpost.

The NILO, Tan An, in PERINTREP 15-71 of 30 July elucidated the events of the month: "Although contacts with the enemy have dropped significantly, there has been no corresponding drop in the activity level of friendly forces, or in the number of agent reports received dealing with enemy movements. RF/PF troops continue to set large numbers of night ambushes, and have engaged in several sector and district operations, but it seems that the enemy is not interested in confronting friendly forces and is managing to keep well hidden from them. The possibility that the enemy is conserving his forces in anticipation of another "big operation" then arises and is especially interesting in light of the reported movement of large quantities of ammunition into the Ba Vu Secret Zone."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TRAN HUNG DAO IV

Action was very light on the waterways of the TRAN HUNG DAO IV AO during July but the 32nd Battalion, ARVN Rangers, kept up the Allied pressure, engaging the enemy 15 times during ten sweeps. Seawolf helicopters of Detachment One flew 23 missions, including seven PSYOPS, with the following results: five enemy killed, two bunkers, 15 sampans, six structures destroyed; two bunkers, 25 sampans, and 28 structures damaged.

There were four B-40 rocket attacks on boats, two on the Kinh Cai Nhap and one each on the Song Cua Lon and Song Bo De. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were undetermined. During one of the attacks on the Kinh Cai Nhap, aggressive Biet Hai Naval Rangers stormed ashore and captured 21 flashlight batteries and 200 meters of control wire.

Troops of the 32nd ARVN Rangers ranged over wide areas of An Xuyen Province, interdicting enemy lines of communication and disrupting normally safe havens. Results of ARVN operations within the AO were five enemy killed, five captured, and six suspects detained; quantities of arms and ammunition were captured and one 28 bed hospital discovered and rendered useless.

The special warfare experts of Seal Team One, Detachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Golf, Oscar Platoon were used sparingly during July. On the 14th, Seals launched an intelligence gathering operation at VQ 980 831 which resulted in one VC being killed and one captured. There were no friendly casualties. Again on 27 July, at 2200H, the Seals made contact; this time with three VC, at WQ 150 680. A brief firefight ensued and the enemy evaded, leaving metal ammunition boxes with documents, which upon examination proved to be valuable intelligence.

The COMNAVFORV PMS Assistance Team visited ISB Nam Can during July and made encouraging progress. PCFs were being maintained quite well in the program and by month's end both RID 46 and RID 47 were showing improvement. Problem areas were shortages of tools and manuals; steps have been taken to eliminate these problems.

SALVOPS were conducted on 1 July by USN and VNN personnel, and HQ 5113, sunk on 18 May of this year, was rescued from a watery grave. Damage consisted of numerous holes along the starboard side of the boat which were patched prior to dewatering and demudding. The craft was towed back to ISB Nam Can for evaluation prior to repair.

Base defense, a continuing problem at Nam Can was given

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

a boost when the COMNAVFORV Base Defense Officer recommended increasing mortar positions, using sampans for waterborne defense, and increasing spare parts on hand for crew served weapons. The recommendations were carried out, however, problems remained as there were numerous cases of sleeping sentries and other examples of poor base defense posture. At the end of the month, CTF 214.2, the senior Vietnamese officer attached to the base, returned to Nam Can and an immediate improvement was noted in watchstanding.

With the increase in numbers and types of aircraft using the facilities at Nam Can, two problems came into focus; one, the lack of adequate air traffic control procedures and two, the inability to maintain a clean, unpolluted fuel supply. During July, several near misses occurred in the skies above Nam Can and on several occasions aircraft that failed to check in with the Naval Operations Center flew into areas in which artillery was firing. At month's end, procedures were being implemented to deal with these problems. In the fuel pollution area, the problem was found to be water and sludge in the fuel bladder. Since these pollutants could not be purged, it was suggested that a new bladder be brought to Nam Can and a qualified ABF rating be assigned to handle fueling matters.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

On 11 July at Nam Can, six VNN sailors were wounded due to careless handling of a concussion grenade. This accident brought the total killed and injured to 19 in the last three months. The effect can be measured by the fact that, due to accidents of this nature, RID 46 has lost 16.4 percent of its effective strength in the last five months. The Vietnamese Navy has been urged, at the highest levels, to begin a substantive safety program.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

TRAN HUNG DAO V

Enemy activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO V AO remained light as CTG 216.1 reported only three friendly initiated and 12 unilateral firefights, sustaining no casualties among either his units, or the enemy's. U.S. Navy Seawolf helicopters of HAL-3 Detachment 6 from Phu Loi placed 17 strikes in support of naval assets, probably killing one and wounding three of the enemy, and destroying one structure and damaging eight bunkers and a bridge.

The only river incidents of any note occurred on 12 July, 13 kilometers north west of Phu Cuong (XT 690 218), on the Lower Saigon River. At 1845H, nine RAC of RAG 30, in transit north sighted approximately eight to 12 VC on the west bank of the river and opened fire. Seawolves were over the contact area at 1858H (they were diverted from a routine patrol) and commenced firing runs. At 1915H, the helos terminated their firing runs, and the boats sent a reconnaissance team ashore with negative results. The boats continued their transit north, however, and at 2001H, in the vicinity of XT 673 235, four B-40 rockets were fired at the boats, this time from the east bank, all of the rockets missing their targets. Seawolves were again diverted from another patrol to place suppressive fire in the area. There were no casualties during either incident.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

TRAN HUNG DAO VI

Enemy activity in TRAN HUNG DAO VI in July was light as CTG 212.5 assets failed to readily contact the enemy. Commanding Officer, TRAN HUNG DAO VI reported his forces engaged in four firefights, killing 11 of the enemy while suffering no friendly casualties. U.S. Navy Seawolf helicopters of HAL-3 Detachment Eight, staging from the short strip Rach Gia, placed 31 strikes in support of CTG 212.5 assets, killing three of the enemy and probably killing 12 others. During these strikes the "Wolves" destroyed five sampans, seven structures, and damaged 12 sampans, 26 structures, and three bunkers.

On 5 July, Seal Team One, Detachment Golf, Romeo Platoon stood down and departed Rach Soi for the United States. Their departure occasioned the U.S. Army Province Senior Advisor to make the following comments, "...Kien Giang will long remember the Seals for their professionalism, devotion to duty, and mostly for their inexhaustable spirit" (PSA Kien Giang Province msg DTG 050745Z JUL 71).

On 7 July, a spectacular fire occurred at ISB Rach Soi. At approximately 0900H, a 100 Mike JP-4 barge assigned to the U.S. Army sank at the ISB. JP-4 was carried up the Rach Soi

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Canal by the tide. At approximately 1145H, a fire started 800 meters upstream from the barge. The fire burned down the hootch line and approached the barge. When it became evident that the fire could not be prevented from reaching the barge, the base was evacuated. When no explosion resulted, VNN and USN personnel returned to the barge and put out the fire. No USN or VNN personnel were injured, and no base assets were damaged, however, several PBRs of CTG 212.5 were destroyed in the fire. Considerable men and equipment were flown to the scene from LSB Binh Thuy. No civilian casualties were reported although approximately 50 hootches were burned. The base POLWAR Officer, ISB Rach Soi, made arrangements for feeding and sheltering the homeless. The barge was successfully refloated at 2100H on 12 July.

In general, the river assets of CTG 212.5 had difficulty contacting the enemy. The PBRs were involved in a minor skirmish on 20 July, 11 miles south of Rach Gia (WR 148 885); two VC were killed and one weapon was captured during fire support provided by PBRs of RPD 61 for PFs, in contact with an unknown sized enemy force. No friendly casualties were reported. On the morning of 22 July, four PBRs of RPD 61 were attacked with ten B-40 rockets and heavy AK-47

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

fire from the east bank of the Cai Lon (WR 168 830), 15 miles southeast of Rach Gia. One of the PBRs reported several AK-47 hits , but no serious damage or casualties occurred. The PBRs returned and suppressed the enemy fire; enemy casualties were undetermined.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

TRAN HUNG DAO VIII

Activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO VIII AO remained light but the pursuit of the enemy was carried out with extreme diligence and forethought. During July TRAN HUNG DAO VIII units participated in 27 troop movement or support missions for the 7th ARVN, RF and PF troops. Twelve special missions were conducted that consisted of seven POL operations and five convoy escorts. CTU 217.1.1 supported Dinh Tuong and Kien Phuong Province joint operation Tuong Phuong centered around the Wagonwheel area (WS 99 55) for the entire month. CTG 217.1, in command of boats and one RF company, conducted clearing and sweep operations on the lower Kinh Xang for 15 days. Results of this operation included the capture of one VC and discovery of two arms caches consisting of two mines, 20 grenades, and 500 meters of electrical wire. Units in a WBGP captured one VC liaison cadre and apprehended five VC suspects. TG 217.1 engaged the enemy on three occasions. TU 116.7.7 units flew 37 sorties in support of TRAN HUNG DAO VIII operations, killing 70 VC and destroying 22 sampans, nine structures, seven hootches, and 20 bunkers, plus assorted miscellaneous supplies.

The NILO at My Tho had reported that a captured enemy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

document indicated two local force companies in Dinh Tuong Province were targeted against TRAN HUNG DAO VIII boats. One unit, targeted against boats on the Kinh Xang from Dong Tam Navy Base to Highway 4, was reportedly responsible for the 25 June ambush of an RPD-53 craft at XS 394 474. The other unit was reportedly targeted against boats on the Kinh Xang from Highway 4 north to Ap My Dien (XS 31 58).

There have been many recent reports of enemy supply shipments to Dinh Tuong Province. Frequent reports had also been received concerning enemy plans to attack Dong Tam and My Tho and these recent supply shipments increased the likelihood that such attacks were imminent. On 27 June, an intelligence report stated that the VC escort unit of My Tho transported munitions from an unknown location to two caches in an area about seven kilometers northwest of Dong Tam (XS 307 429 and 309 447). On 28 June, another intelligence report indicated an MR-2 rear services unit with approximately 11 men, was in an area 15 kilometers west of Dong Tam (XS 268 413). The unit was transporting a variety of munitions for delivery to the 261A and 261B Battalions. On 31 May, the 261A was pinpointed as being about three miles northwest of Dong Tam at XS 382 468. A further report on 14 July indicated a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

possible rocket cache in an area about 13 kilometers northeast of My Tho at XS 543 588. This cache was supposedly earmarked for an upcoming "big operation". Again on 19 July, the VC MR-2 rear services unit was mentioned as the unit responsible for the delivery of supplies to elements of the 261A and 261B Battalions. The reported ammunition distribution in this area, mentioned in this report, added credence to previous reports of enemy plans to attack the Dong Tam Base and My Tho City at an unspecified time. But for all the prognostications by the intelligence sources, the month was quiet in comparison to the past, and if these reports were correct, the "big operation" was a possibility just prior to the general elections.

An interesting development occurred on the political front with the report of the recent breakup of the 88th NVA Regiment into smaller units and their incorporation into province guerrilla units on a sub-district "Mang" level. Most of the NVA in the "Mang" are political officers and proselytizing cadre. With this organization established and operating in the province, a grass roots power base could be the result and could act as the spring board for political gain in the fall. On 20 July, an additional report indicated the VC intentions to divide VC My Tho into "Mangs" to achieve closer control over the population.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

NILO My Tho stated that the constant presence of RF and ARVN outposts in the province resulted in the VC's realization that large units were, for the time being, ineffective. By breaking up into smaller units, the VC can increase their political influence considerably on the village and hamlet level, where the ballot box is located.

Waterborne and Seal units combined on several occasions to pursue the enemy in his strongholds and attempt to keep him off balance. On 29 June at 2130H, Seals and Luc Luong 66s conducted a VC supply route interdiction mission five miles west of Dong Tam (XS 332 403). A MAT Team observed five sampans making a crossing in the area, and the Seals were notified. The Seals proceeded to the crossing area using an LSSC and MSSC, and upon arrival at the target point, were suddenly illuminated by a passing tug, compromising their position. The Seal craft proceeded up river detecting a sampan with two occupants pulled by a third person who was in the river. As the Seals approached, the occupants fled to the shore, but after being spotlighted by the Seals they stopped, and were captured. The three males were questioned and two of the males 12 to 14 years old were released while the 20 year old was detained.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

On 2 July at 2115H, Seals and Luc Luong 66s conducted a mission against an enemy weapons cache located six miles west of Dong Tam (XS 309 429). The Seals inserted in three squads following preparatory strikes of the entire area by the Seawolves. Claymore mines were used to clear booby traps in the area and a thorough search was then conducted. During the search, one weapons cache and a bunker complex were discovered resulting in one bunker complex and two structures destroyed and eight M-16s captured.

On 5 July at 2340H, three boats of RAG 21/33 were attacked with an unknown number of B-40 rockets two miles northwest of Dong Tam at XS 393 466. The boats returned the enemy fire and two PBRs made firing runs to assist. There were no casualties or damage to the craft and enemy casualties were undetermined.

On 7 July at 1720H, Seals and Luc Luong 66s, accompanied by four Australian Air Services personnel, conducted an ambush mission against a squad of local force NVA located six miles northwest of Dong Tam (XS 333 473). The Seals were inserted by Sealord helicopters while the Seawolves placed diversionary strikes. During insertion, Seawolves detected one armed, evading VC and took him under fire with unknown results. The Seals then

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

conducted a search of hootches in the area and flushed out five VC who evaded. The Seawolves immediately placed a strike in the direction of their escape and then effected a false extraction by taking aboard only a few of the personnel while the rest set up an ambush position. After the Seawolves departure, two armed VC, approached the area and the Seals took Them under fire. After the operation was concluded, the Seals patrolled to the east and west then completely extracted. No friendly casualties were incurred and one VC was killed.

On 9 July at 1600H, an LCM of RAG 21/33 was attacked with one B-40 rocket two miles northwest of Dong Tam (XS 391 476). The rocket missed its mark and the LCM and four accompanying PBRs returned the enemy fire. Other RAG 21/33 boats immediately embarked PF troops who swept the area, resulting in the capture of 300 meters of electrical wire. No enemy or friendly casualties were reported.

On 11 July at 2355H, six boats of RID 42 and RF Boat Company 96, in an ambush position 11 miles northwest of Dong Tam (XS 268 585), came under a B-40 rocket and small arms attack. One of the rockets detonated on a tree near the boats resulting in five VNN and three RFs being wounded. The boats returned the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

enemy fire and using the bi-lingual brevity Di Mau Code, called in Seawolf strikes. After suppressing the fire, Seawolves landed and medevaced the two seriously wounded Vietnamese.

On 27 July at 1800H, Seals, acting on intelligence received from a Hoi Chanh, conducted a mission to verify and interdict a staging area 26 miles northwest of Dong Tam (XS 037 564). The Seals were inserted by Sealord helicopters, two squads inserting 100 meters from each other. Both squads came under fire during insertion and observed armed VC evading. Support Seawolves took the evading VC under fire and managed to kill two in the brief encounter. The Seawolves received hits during the strike but reported no significant damage and no casualties. The Seal squads then advanced toward their objectives and both were taken under fire from three separate locations. Both squads returned the enemy fire and called in Seawolf strikes. The first squad then entered a hootch and discovered food, clothing, documents, and two ammunition cans full of AK-47 and M-16 rounds. The Seals also observed indications of booby traps in the hootch and as a result fired it, causing two secondary explosions when the hootch burned. In the meantime, the second squad advanced on a second hootch and fired 40 millimeter CS into the hootch, and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

also into a bunker located just below the hootch, with negative results.

On conclusion of the sweep, one VC was killed when he was detected in tall grass as the Seal squad was advancing to the southeast.

With no further ground encounters, the two squads were extracted by

Sealord helicopters but not without again being fired upon. The

Seawolves lurking in the area promptly placed additional strikes

on the enemy location. The results of the operation were two

VC killed by the Seals, four VC killed by the Seawolves; four

weapons, ammunition, and one kilo of documents were captured.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

TRAN HUNG DAO IX

There was no action in the TRAN HUNG DAO IX AO during July. Planning was started on a new operation to be named TRAN HUNG DAO XXV which will be organized to include the same general area and would replace TRAN HUNG DAO IX.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII

The Mekong convoy operations finally managed, in the month of July, to somewhat satisfy the needs of the Cambodians. New contracts commencing 1 July allowed more ships to participate in the convoys. The second of three convoys for the month ran into enemy resistance, as it did on its return trip, but as ever the enemy was wholly unsuccessful at reaching the convoy.

The first expanded convoy, TP-25, departed Tan Chau assembly area at 2100H on 5 July, harboring an unprecedented two and one half million gallons of POL. The convoy consisted of 17 ships, tugs with barges, and tankers, and was divided into fast and slow elements for better command and control. The fast element anchored at Neak Luong at 0300H and waited for the slow element. At 0700H both elements joined and proceeded towards Phnom Penh. A change in convoy escort procedures was required in order to provide the normal close-in escorts for the increased number of vessels.

The ambush teams were reduced to one per element and the blocking force was absorbed by the main bodies for escort duty. There was no reduction in the capability to react and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

disrupt enemy attacks against the merchant ships, but the ability to hurt the enemy after the ambush was lessened. The convoy arrived without incident at Phnom Penh at 1200H on 6 July. The last tanker, TAN THANH PHU, developed steering problems and arrived later under the tow of two ASPBs. The return convoy, PT-25, with 11 vessels, departed on 7 July at 1000H, and arrived eight hours later at Tan Chau without incident.

On 13 July convoy TP-26 which was preceded by ARVN sweeps upriver was attacked by an estimated company of VC. A USA LOACH was downed during the operation, with both pilots rescued; an event that would be repeated two days later on 15 July with convoy PT-26. Convoy TP-26 departed Tan Chau at 2100H, consisting of 18 ships, tankers, tugs with barges, and LCM-8s, and divided into a fast and slow element. Almost two million gallons of POL and almost 4,000 tons of general cargo were transported. At 0017H the merchant ship ALLY, in the vicinity of WT 211 190, was hit by two rounds of 57mm rockets resulting in two crewmen being wounded and slight damage to the ship. Enemy fire was received from both banks of the river. For the first time in convoy operations a change in ambush tactics was noted. The enemy used three firing sites in

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the same general area to insure better coverage of the longer convoys. Prompt action by the VNN PBR ambush team and air strikes denied the enemy any real success, and the convoy maintained its speed without delays. Detachment Five Seawolves from Chau Doc had scrambled in pairs on two occasions to place strikes on both banks under the convoy commander's instructions. The convoy arrived at 1545H on 14 July without further incident, though it was discovered that five vehicles on a barge were missing their batteries and spare tires.

On the return trip, PT-26 was delayed an hour due to mooring problems encountered by the tug SHAWNEE. The convoy, consisting of ten vessels and two barges, departed without the SHAWNEE at 1135H of 15 July. At 1617H, in the vicinity of WT 211 090, a U.S. Army Baron Aircraft spotted an enemy recoilless rifle team and rolled in to place strikes. During the air engagement all aircraft received heavy ground fire resulting in one U.S. Army light observation helicopter being shot down near WT 21 90. Both pilots were recovered from the river by PBRs and were taken to YRBM-21 where they were reported to be only slightly injured. The engagement was continued as Cobras, Seawolves, and accompanying boats placed fire on the enemy position until fire was suppressed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approximately one mile down river Seawolves spotted manned enemy bunkers and placed strikes in the area as tactical air support was requested. U.S.A.F. fighters placed strikes in the area of WT 222 072 consisting of four 500 pound bombs, napalm, and rockets. The strikes were followed by a ground sweep that revealed five enemy killed. The ground troops also captured one AK-47 and a recoilless rifle ground mount. The convoy itself received no damage, and arrived at Tan Chau at 1715H. The next day the tug SHAWNEE finally got underway, leaving Phnom Penh without escort for Neak Luong, demonstrating thusly the secure nature of that area of the Mekong. She met an escort at Neak Luong, as the trip south to Tan Chau was considered more hazardous, and arrived there at 1515H without incident.

Convoy TP-27, composed of four tankers and five tugs towing barges, departed the staging area at 2015H on 22 July. At 2230H, while still south of the border, the tanker LAKANDULA developed engine trouble and turned back with escort. At 0330H on 23 July, at WT 212 247, the tanker BAUAN ran aground. The convoy continued, and two PCFs stood by for security. At 0535H the tanker was reported free and continuing up river. The lead element of the convoy arrived at Phnom Penh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

at 1500H, with the rest harbored by 2130H. The return convoy, PT-27, composed of eight ships and three tugs, departed at 1145H on 24 July, arriving in Tan Chau without incident six hours later.

The three convoys of the month raised stocks of POL to more comfortable levels, though schedules were still delayed. While Telakhmer finally acquired in July enough vessels under contract to bring as much as 17,000 cubic meters of POL per convoy, the amount was difficult to unload since the convoys turned around for Tan Chau 15 hours after arrival, and since the strong current prevented more than two ships from tying up alongside each other at the unloading site. Telakhmer's persistent requests for additional convoys were rejected, as escort assets were proving hard to obtain.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

TRAN HUNG DAO XIX

Forces in the TRAN HUNG DAO XIX AO went on the offensive during the month of July with a series of combined VNN/ARVN operations placing great pressure on the enemy in Kien Hoa Province. Although waterborne units rarely encountered the enemy, they nevertheless acted as blocking and supporting forces and deprived the VC of escape by water. In this respect, Rag 23/31 supported the First Battalion, Tenth Regiment on the west Bai Lai River and the Reconnaissance Company, Tenth Regiment, on the east Bai Lai River. LSIL 331 was used for firing runs on different occasions in Thanh Phu District. RID 45 patrolled the Ham Luong River and RPD 58 PBRs were at WBGp on the east Bai Lai River and Lao Lan Island (XS 500 268). Coastal Group 34 and 35 junks also patrolled the Ham Luong River.

During the month, CTG 217.2 units in Kien Hoa Province combined to kill 229 and capture 70 VC. Friendly casualties included 52 killed, 185 wounded, and 6 missing. In addition, eight incidents of OP harrassment, five assassinations, and two attempted assassinations were reported throughout the province, while one outpost was overrun in Thanh Phu District.

Waterborne units were involved in three firefights on different occasions. Two VC were killed while friendly units suffered

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

one casualty. No damage resulted to the craft in any of the incidents.

TU 116.7.9 supported TRAN HUNG DAO XIX operations by flying 35 sorties, resulting in ten VC killed and two captured, while 22 sampans, 11 structures, 18 bunkers and eight hootches were destroyed.

Black Pony and Leatherneck (OV 10-D) aircraft were flown in 14 sorties against an enemy stronghold located approximately 72 kilometers southeast of Dong Tam. Results of the sweeps indicated that 31 VC were killed; 32 sampans, ten structures, and ten bunkers were destroyed. On 23 July, OV 10-D aircraft reported receiving 12.7 millimeter fire from the enemy. This was the first occurrence of this type of enemy action.

The pursuit of the enemy in Kien Hoa Province served to indicate the overwhelming desire by the GVN to pacify this strategic area. The enemy is still firmly entrenched as was noted by the many VC killed, wounded, or captured. Thanh Phu District contains approximately 37,100 people of which 64 percent live under GVN control while 36 percent live in contested villages and hamlets. An intelligence source had recently stated that, since the withdrawal of the US 9th Division in 1970, pacification has declined. He stated

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

the population of the district was greatly influenced by the VC either because of family ties or terrorism. While the 7th ARVN had pacified about 80 percent of the land area, the source believed only about 10 percent of the population was loyal to the GVN and the other 90 percent was controlled by the VC. (COMNAVFORV INTSUM 168-71).

Some of the enemy units reported as operating throughout the province were: F-105X Boat Hunting Company which was located approximately five kilometers southeast of Ben Tre and which was charged with monitoring VNN radio frequencies to gain information on operations in progress; C-540 Local Force Company which was located six kilometers west of Ben Tre and which was charged with attacking boats moving along the Cai Cam Canal; an unidentified platoon sized unit charged with the shipment of munitions in the Binh Dai Secret Zone; C-270 Underwater Demolition Company charged with the demolition of fixed targets such as anchored ships, ferry landings, and bridges; and two companies of the D-16 Transportation Battalion charged with the building of defensive fortifications in the Binh Dai Secret Zone.

In a captured enemy document, it was emphasized that the VC must attack the GVN at all levels, using sapper, guerrilla, and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

secret guerrilla techniques. In the cities and towns, a combination of military activity and proselytizing is to be achieved. In all areas, there was to be contact with families of GVN soldiers.

Although activity by waterborne units was confined to support and logistics, three firefights, plus a special minesweeping mission, were recorded during the month. On 1 July, six RAG 23/31 craft formed with two tugs and two barges along with two LCVP minesweeps to proceed up the Song Co Chien (XS 450 070) while two LOHs and two Cobras provided air cover. The convoy was proceeding to a bridge construction site located at the mouth of the Thu Hue Canal (XS 382 020). No major incidents or problems developed on the journey although fish net wires were strung out across the canal. As the tugs completed positioning the barges and the river craft repositioned for the trip back, the LCVPs strayed downstream (XS 377 009) and received small arms fire from the west bank. The two LCVPs returned the fire, and with aid from the LOHs, suppressed it completely. The boats then returned to the construction site. One Vietnamese sailor was wounded slightly and only minor damage occurred to the LCVPs. With the barge finally positioned, the craft formed up and proceeded out of the canals and river without further incident. COMNAVFORV

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

complimented the Senior Advisor CTG 217.2 on the highly professional manner in which this mission was accomplished.

On 9 July, LSSL 230 fired on an intelligence target in Thanh Phu District, Kien Hoa Province which was indicated as the VC headquarters for the district. The LSSL fired 47 three inch rounds, 35 81mm rounds, and 589 40mm rounds. Both air and surface bursts were used during the firing. An intelligence report indicated that the firing destroyed 40 percent of VC Thanh Phu District Headquarters and that the VC were again rebuilding the site.

On 15 July, RID 45 craft preceeded by two RAG 23/31 LCVP mine sweepers reentered the Rach Cai Hap and escorted a tug from XS 323 033 to the Co Chien River. Although minor problems were encountered with the engine of one of the LCVPs, the mission was completed without incident. But in the afternoon as two barges were being towed by the tug, one ASPB received small arms fire from the north bank. The Cobras immediately placed a strike in the area and suppressed the fire. Then at XS 423 038 on the Song Lang, an ASPB and one ATC received small arms fire which was again immediately suppressed by both river craft and Cobra gunships. No casualties or damage to river craft resulted from the gunfire.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

On 28 July, RPD 58 PBRs which had just relieved RPD-56 the previous day, immediately entered the conflict as they attempted to set an ambush on the east Bai Lai River (XS 588 342). The PBRs detected two sampans moving with three males on board and promptly initiated action with M-16s and M-60 weapons. The males either dove or fell overboard and were then taken under grenade attack. No bodies were recovered and one sampan was sunk. One sampan was captured along with documents and one M-16 magazine.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

TRAN HUNG DAO XX

The TRAN HUNG DAO XX AO was again among the quietest areas in Vietnam during July. It was apparent, however, from DUFFLEBAG activations and intelligence sources along the Vinh Te Canal, that infiltration was taking place.

Seawolf aircraft attacked infiltration routes in around the Seven Mountains area 15 times during the month. Due to the absence of friendly troops or delays in mounting infantry sweeps, battle damage assessments were not available.

At 2000H on 15 July, junks of CG 44 engaged in a unilateral firing when a sensor was activated at VS 480 540. No casualties were incurred by friendly units and enemy casualties were not known.

On the morning of 20 July, civilians reported seeing a "strange" object in the waters of the Giang Thanh River; the object was a watermine and it was taken to Cu Duc RF/PF outpost. TRAN HUNG DAO XX forces were alerted and EOD personnel were moved into the area. The device was then towed to Ha Tien where it was destroyed. The mine was reported to have been of U.S. origin of a type frequently used by Seals. Due to its corroded condition it was estimated that the mine may

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

have been in the water for upwards of 12 months.

On 22 July at 2120H heavy sensor activations were received from an area northeast of Ha Tien. A reaction team of ten sampans and five junks was dispatched but no contact was established. Evidence was found, however, suggesting recent use of the area as an infiltration point.

Two more unilateral firings occurred on 24 July at 2005H and at 2105H when sensors located at VS 479 528 and VS 479 537 were activated. Reaction to both activations was made with mortar and machine gun fire by junks of CG 44. Results of the firing were unknown.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TRAN HUNG DAO XXI

The waterways of TRAN HUNG DAO XXI were extremely quiet during July as there were no waterborne firefights and only two mining incidents. Seawolf helicopters of Detachment Three based at Ca Mau ranged over northern An Xuyen and southern Kien Giang Province in support of TRAN HUNG DAO XXI operations and U.S. Army Military Assistance Teams. They flew 22 missions, killing five VC/NVA and destroying 37 sampans, four structures and four bunkers, while damaging ten sampans, 19 structures and eight bunkers.

Intelligence gathered in July from normal channels and from Hoi Chanh pointed to two major trends; the first trend was to wrest control of the Song Ong Doc and surrounding territory from the GVN. Both the C-7 Sapper Battalion and the San Tau Mobile Company were reported just south of the Song Ong Doc, the former at VQ 916 694 and the latter at VQ 872 993. Both units were armed with watermines, B-40 rockets, and individual weapons. The second trend was more specific in that an attack was in the planning stages, targeted against Kien An OP Base. The base was probed in the early morning of 25 July at 0400H by an estimated 30 personnel. The Camp Sentinel Radar System detected them and rapid and accurate fire by USN 60mm mortar teams forced

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the enemy to retreat. The VNN 81mm mortar team took the fleeing enemy under fire and completed the rout. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were undetermined. This probe tended to confirm the intelligence reports but at the end of the month, no attack had materialized, perhaps due to the strong defense posture of the base.

On 4 July, nine boats of CTG 210.2 embarked three companies of ARVN Infantry for a sweep in the vicinity of WR 007 365, to clear the area for construction of a new outpost. Shortly after the insertion a 40 kilo mine was spotted floating on the canal and captured. The mine was probably swept by the chain drag minesweepers preceeding the convoy.

The VC lost a large weapons cache on 6 July when a Hoi Chanh led elements of the 1st Battalion, 32nd ARVN Regiment to a spot in the vicinity of VR 943 545 in the heart of the U Minh. The cache included one 60mm mortar, one 75mm recoilless rifle, two 20mm cannon, and various explosives.

On 12 July at 2045H, one unknown type artillery shell impacted about ten feet inside the western perimeter of ISB Ca Mau, presently under construction by Seabees of NMCB - Five, Detachment Mustang. There were no personnel casualties

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

attributed to the explosion, however, one man broke his leg while running to the bunker.

The second watermine captured during the month was taken on the Cai Tau Canal at VQ 970 398 near the 32nd Regimental Command Post. HQ 5126 of RAID 75 found the 15 kilo device and later destroyed it at the request of the ARVN.

RAID 72 advisors found two wounded Vietnamese civilians at Toan Thang, on the Song Trem Trem at 1315H on 21 July; they called in a Sealord aircraft to medevac the two personnel to Ca Mau. Officials later discovered that the civilians were wounded by a dud M-79 round.

On 22 July at 2115H, crewmembers of an ASPB of RAID 75, moored at WR 007 365 near an RF/PF outpost, heard noises and during a check of their immediate surroundings, found nylon cord tied to their craft. This line was immediately cut and the river-craft moved to a new location. Two hours later the previous position of the boats was the sight of a shattering explosion. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were undetermined.

Song Ong Doc district town received between 15-20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from 0500H to 0600H on 25 July. RAG 26 boats immediately got underway and avoided damage.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

There were no USN or VNN casualties, but one RF soldier was killed and two were wounded.

On 26 July at 0320H, a small outpost on the south bank of the Song Ong Doc at VQ 805 968, was partially overrun by an estimated reinforced platoon. Five RF/PF soldiers and five civilians were killed and 24 personnel were wounded including four US Army MAT advisors. Moderate quantities of arms were also lost; enemy casualties were undetermined.

Electric power problems at the MACV compound were exacerbated by construction of new naval billeting, and the Army at Ca Mau advised the Navy that it could no longer supply power to support the naval tenant commands. This resulted in the installation of a 60 KW generator in the compound to serve the electrical "needs of the Navy" and the defusing of a possible Army/Navy confrontation.

PMS teams made progress during the month as they delivered manuals, and gave short training lectures at both Ca Mau and Kien An. SA CTF 210 stated "PMS procedures and their related importance for maintenance of CTF 210 RAID/RAG units have been thoroughly emphasized within the Naval Advisory

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Organization and with VNN counterparts. This program is accorded highest precedence over all evolutions except urgent operational commitments."¹

1. SA CTF 210 msg 230713Z JUL 71

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE

During the month of July, the Rung Sat forces conducted seven CHUONG DUONG airmobile/watermobile sweeps, but the enemy evaded consistently under the extreme pressure, and reports indicated that enemy troops were still infiltrating into the area. Results of the Slick/RPC/LCM inserts were often unrewarding, as the enemy found convenient hidden bunkers, to disappear into, but the sweeps effectively kept the enemy away from the Long Tau shipping channel for the ninth month in a row. The results were as follows: 11 enemy killed (two by air) and two captured, a sizeable arms cache discovered, and 70 bunkers destroyed. The abundance of bunkers evince the type of war being fought in the Rung Sat, where the enemy must daily face the awesome rocket and machinegun fire from the Seawolves, and must daily elude reconnaissance planes and patrolling local forces. To survive, he has dug, and he is surviving, though miserably.


The USN Seawolves of Detachment 2 out of Nha Be rode "shotgun" over the CHUONG DUONG operations during the month, accounting for several of the kills. They also flew upwards of 23 routine intelligence directed missions on suspected enemy locations, with results ascertained on only four occasions.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED



Tactical boundaries of the Rung Sat Special Zone. The dotted line indicates the Long Tau Shipping Channel.



The Logistics Support Base at Nha Be, 13 kilometers, south of Saigon, provides support for PBRs and Seawolves protecting the Long Tau Shipping Channel and prosecuting sweeps in the Rung Sat Special Zone.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The operations in the Rung Sat were generally one-sided. Local forces in strength hunted for an elusive enemy chary of combat, while supporting Seawolves overhead (on short notice) gave the VC good reason to seek bunkers. On 1 July at 1815H, 18 miles southeast of Nha Be, an RF company enroute to a night ambush position came in contact with three to five VC. The RFs initiated the fire and the VC fled. Seawolves placed strikes on the evasion route near XS 030 508, but the enemy casualties were unknown. Searching the area after the strike, the RFs found 400 pounds of rice and assorted quartermaster gear.

In a typical CHUONG DUONG airmobile/watermobile operation, three RF companies were inserted by US Army Slicks, boats of RPD 57, RAG 27, and RF Boat Company 29, on 1-3 July in an area centered 17 miles southeast of Nha Be. They made contact twice during the three day operation, resulting in two VC killed and one wounded, while one RF soldier was wounded. The results of the operations were 25 bunkers, two tunnels, two sampans and assorted supplies destroyed. Still, the enemy appeared to be building bunkers faster than the allies could destroy them.

On 2 July at 1830H, an RF company enroute to a night ambush position came into contact with five to eight VC in the

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

vicinity of YS 023 502, 17 miles southeast of Nha Be. Seawolves were scrambled and accounted for two kills. One RF was wounded before the action was taken out of the hands of the ground forces.

Though sweeps were conducted daily, most were unproductive, while one stands out as an example of PRU power. On 14 and 15 July, 40 PRUs with Slick support conducted a sweep in an area centered 15 miles east of Nha Be near YS 20 82. On the first day, nine PRUs came into contact with an unknown number of VC, and dispatched seven of them, while one PRU was wounded in return. The reputation of the PRUs is built on hard encounters such as these. On the same day, and in the same vicinity, a USN LHFT placed an air strike which destroyed 45 bunkers. On the second day, the PRUs captured one assistant platoon leader and several guns.

On 17 July at 1300H, while conducting a daytime sweep, an RF company came across a huge arms cache which upstaged arms captured in the entire military region. At a spot 28 kilometers southeast of Nha Be, in the vicinity of YS 204 709, the company uncovered 23 M3A1 sub machine guns, three CKC rifles, one 7.92 German mauser, and destroyed 100 kilos of TNT in quarter pound blocks, as well as 500,000 rounds of CKC ammo.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

CTF 211

The following was the disposition of the RAID units at the end of July:

<u>RAID</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>Location</u>
70	CTG 210.1	Kien An
71	CTG 210.1	Kien An
72	CTG 210.1	Kien An
73	CTG 210.1	Kien An
74	CTG 210.2	Ca Mau
75	CTG 210.2	Ca Mau

Each RAID is composed of approximately eight ATCs, five ASPBs, two MONs, one CCB, and one REF. The RAIDs are reviewed in their respective operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CTF 212

The following was the disposition of RPD units at the end of July:

<u>RPD</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>Location</u>
51	CMD	Cat Lai
52	216.1	Phu Cuong
53	214.1	Ben Luc
54	214.1	Ben Keo, Tan An, Ben Luc
55	218.2	Tan Chau, Chau Doc
56	214.1	Ben Luc
57	228	Nha Be
58	217.2	Ben Tre
59	218.2	Tan Chau
60	CHI LANG I	DaNang/Thuan An
61	212.5	Rach Soi
62	212.6	Phuoc Xuyen
63	212.5	Rach Soi
64	214.1	Tuyen Nhon/Moc Hoa
65	Training	Binh Thuy

Each RPD is composed of approximately 20 PBRs and is reviewed in the operation in which it operates.

CTF 214

The following was the disposition of RID units at the end of July:

<u>RID</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>Location</u>
40	214.1	Go Dau Ha
41	218.2	Tan Chau
42	217.1	Dong Tam
43	216.1	Phu Cuong
44	214.1	Tra Cu
45	217.2	Dong Tam
46	214.2	Nam Can
47	214.2	Nam Can
48	218.2	Tan Chau

Each RID is generally composed of approximately five ATCs, one MON, six ASPBs, one CCB, one Zippo, one REF, and one RECH. The RIDs are reviewed in their respective operations.

RIVER ASSAULT GROUPS

The following was the disposition of RAG units at the end of July:

<u>RAG</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>Location</u>
22	CTF 228	Nha Be
24	CTG 216.1	Phu Cuong
26	CTF 210	Ca Mau
27	CTF 228	Nha Be
28	Commander, Third Riverine Area	Long Binh
30	CTG 216.1	Phu Cuong
32	Commander, First Coastal Zone	Hue
21/33	CTG 217.1	Dong Tam
23/31	CTG 217.2	Vinh Long
25/29	CTG 210.3	Ca Mau
81	Convoy Escort Fourth Riverine Area	Cat Lai

Each RAG is composed of approximately five ATCs, one MON, one ASPB, four CCBs, and six LCM-6s. The RAGs are reviewed in their respective operations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

SPECIAL WARFARE

The following was the disposition of the Seal Detachments operating in a combat capacity throughout the country at the end of July:

<u>Detachment</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Officer-in-Charge</u>
Team One Det Golf November Platoon	116.6.2	Dong Tam	LT Fletcher
Team One Det Golf Papa Platoon	116.13.2	Ca Mau	LT Antrim
Team One Det Golf Quebec Platoon	116.10.2	Ben Luc	LTJG Taylor
Team One Det Golf Oscar Platoon	116.1.2	Nam Can	LTJG Walsh

Seal units are reviewed in their respective operational areas.

Romeo Platoon of Seal Team One stood down on 27 July.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

CTG 116.7

The following was the disposition of HAL-3 Detachments at the end of July:

<u>Det.</u>	<u>Task Org.</u>	<u>Location</u>
1	116.7.1	Nam Can
2	116.7.2	Nha Be
3	116.7.3	Ca Mau
4	116.7.4	Ben Luc
5	116.7.5	Chau Doc
6	116.7.6	Phu Loi
7	116.7.7	Dong Tam
8	116.7.8	Rach Gia
9	116.7.9	USS WESTCHESTER COUNTY (LST 1167)
		USS WINDHAM COUNTY (LST 1170) From 29 to 31 July located at YS 00 00

Seawolf units are reviewed as a part of the operations in which they participate. A detachment usually consists of nine pilots and nine enlisted door gunners and two UH-1B helicopters. Only routine maintenance is done at the detachments; major tasks are accomplished at Binh Thuy, the "home" of the squadron.

In July the Seawolves flew 1144 missions of which 117

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

missions were in contact with the enemy; 62 enemy were killed.
123 structures, 101 bunkers and 163 sampans were damaged or
destroyed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CTG 116.8

During July the "Bonies" flew 270 missions of which 118 were in contact with the enemy. 227 enemy were killed; 130 structures, 248 bunkers, and 122 sampans were damaged or destroyed.

A new combination, Black Pony OV-10 aircraft armed with CBU-55 bombs, the newest ordnance in Vietnam, made their mark in July; they were used on numerous occasions to clear insertion points of mines and booby traps and also against several intelligence targets with devastating results.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCES

During July, MARKET TIME patrol units of the U.S. Navy inspected 457 craft during day and night patrols, boarded 55 and detained none. The MARKET TIME forces had an average of two MSOs, one LST, three PGs, two WHECs, and one DE on patrol during the month. The VNN TRAN HUNG DAO XV Inner Barrier units boarded 13,305 junks and sampans, detaining 85 persons. Coastal Surveillance units engaged in NGFS accounted for 12 structures destroyed, eight damaged; one bunker, and one sampan destroyed.

Cloud operations were implemented in all four coastal zones in July. A common problem seemed to be lack of senior OTCs experienced in unit coordination. Another problem area was communications. Not all units within a cloud were able to communicate effectively among themselves and with their respective zone commander.

MARKET TIME P-3 air barrier units commenced a trial period of advancing patrols between the Republic of Vietnam and high infiltration trawler threat areas on 1 July. The advancing patrol was designed to give intensive coverage to traffic traversing the South China Sea to Military Region Four. Under

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

the advancing patrol concept, one flight daily was to be dedicated to MARKET TIME operations. However, Seventh Fleet augmented this coverage with operational flights serving a two-fold purpose; to satisfy other requirements in the South China Sea directed by higher authority along with countering sea infiltration to the RVN coast. This provided adequate coverage of the southern portion of the RVN coast but left noticeable gaps on occasion in the northern coastal areas of South Vietnam. VARS (visual air reconnaissance) flights continued to be flown in all coastal zones, providing additional coverage of these areas.

USCGC RUSH departed Vietnam waters on 4 July, having performed yeoman service as a MARKET TIME unit. RUSH participated in the sinkings of two infiltration trawlers in November 1970 and April 1971.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FIRST COASTAL ZONE

Typhoons swept through the First Coastal Zone in July, causing minor damage along the coast and reducing the effectiveness of MARKET TIME and TRAN HUNG DAO XV patrols. The "Cloud" Task Unit 213.1.1 encountered coordination difficulties due to inexperienced, junior OTCs. The Cua Viet, closed to water traffic due to the suspected presence of an NVA HAT-2 mine in the river mouth, was opened on 11 July after repeated sweeps failed to locate the mine. Enemy mining activity on the Cua Viet remained moderate, however, as enemy emphasis shifted from the eastern to the western portion of the river. This activity resulted in the sinking of a loaded rock barge on 26 July. Enemy activity in the CHI LANG I AO was light to moderate. An unfortunate NGFS accident in this AO resulted in the wounding of four civilians near the Coastal Group 14 OP Base on the morning of 16 July.

During the month Typhoons Harriet, Ivy, Kim and Jean caused moderate damage throughout the First Coastal Zone, mostly in the DaNang area. The Naval Support Facility DaNang reported one VNN PBR, one LCVP and a skimmer sunk because of the storms. All of the boats were later refloated. One LCM was

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

reported moderately damaged. One Navy barracks was moderately damaged, and the VNN harbor security causeway was grounded and later freed. The harbor entrance control point reported receiving structural damage to a building, damage to roof top antennas and one radar dome antenna lost.

Elsewhere throughout the First Coastal Zone, OP Base Hue reported minor structural damage to structures throughout the base and temporary loss of communications. OP Base Cua Viet reported one third of the anti-swimmer fence was washed away and three barges were broken away during the storms. One of the barges sank 500 meters down river, one washed into the LST ramp and the other barge beached near the base. Coastal Group 12 at Tuan An reported one junk sunk which was later refloated, and also reported moderate damage to dependent housing. CG 13 at Cua Tu Hien reported one USN outboard engine lost and heavy damage to dependent housing. CG 14 at Hoi An reported minor damage to dependent housing. CG 15 at An Hoa reported minor damage to some of the structures on the base. Many aids to navigation in the Tan My Harbor were destroyed or dislocated, resulting in the closing of the channel. Elsewhere, damage was light, and the main effect of the typhoons was the curtailment of patrols due to high seas.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

During July, the "Cloud" task unit in the First Coastal Zone, TU 213.1.1, experienced some difficulties. The task unit, composed of PGMs and WPBs, did not have commanding officers with enough experience to effectively coordinate patrols of the various elements. The First Coastal Zone Advisor recommended that more aggressive on-scene leadership, such as can be provided by an O-4 or above, was needed to make the Cloud Concept viable.¹ The Executive Officer, COSFLOT ONE, departed DaNang on 26 July to assume the position of OTC until the reassignment of a PCE with its more experienced, and more senior commanding officer, to the task unit.

One of the task unit elements, PGM 612, experienced difficulty of another sort at 2355H on 19 July, approximately 25 kilometers east of Chu Lai (BT 785 070). The PGM spotted USNS LST 1067 about five miles from the coast and instigated challenge procedures, with negative reaction from the LST. While the PGM was dead in the water and still sending the challenge, the LST collided with the PGM's bow causing moderate damage. LST 1067 failed to stop or answer the challenge. Fortunately, there were no personnel casualties.

1. SA CTG 213.1 msg 230830Z JUL 71

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

During July on the Cua Viet, enemy activity remained moderate with 15 mining incidents reported. Eleven of these incidents involved mine recoveries, three involved harmless detonations, while one resulted in the sinking of another rock barge. Several of the mine recoveries were aided by civilians, demonstrating the effectiveness of Coastal Group 11's PSYOPS campaign. The majority of these incidents occurred in the western part of the river, a shift of enemy emphasis from the eastern portions of the Cua Viet.

The one sinking of the month in the Cua Viet happened on the morning of 26 July. A loaded rock barge, pulled by a tug, detonated a mine at YD 311 682. The tug was following the second set of sweep boats, all passing over the mine without incident, indicating the mine was specially set for the higher pressure gradient of the rock barge. The barge sank without blocking the channel.

Coastal Group 11 was instrumental in aiding survivors of an overturned sampan on 27 July. The sampan, carrying 32 people, overturned due to wind and choppy seas. Twenty people survived with no injuries, two were medevaced, while ten lost their lives.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

The intensive search for the HAT-2 mine supposedly planted by two captured watersappers in June was called off on 11 July, and the Cua Viet waterway was reopened. The decision to reopen the waterway was heavily influenced by the fact that intensive sweep operations failed to locate the mine, and that on 9 July, a dry docking ammi moored at OP Base Cua Viet, broke loose and was carried through the channel and out to sea by the swift current. LCMs located the ammi and returned it to the pier with no damage. The ammi and LCMs had to travel over the suspected location of the missing HAT-2 mine, yet failed to trigger anything.

A number of incidents occurred in the CHI LANG I AO during July. At 2230H on 2 July, a Coastal Group 14 Yabuta junk in a WBGP (BT 194 565) heard VC talking on a loudspeaker. The Yabuta opened fire with .30 and .50 caliber machine guns, receiving no return fire. At about the same time, another CG 14 Yabuta, with SA CG 14 embarked, was investigating the report of a half sunk fishing boat in the vicinity of BT 222 555. The U.S. advisor and the VNN patrol officer disembarked from the craft and began searching for the stricken vessel. While they were gone, the Yabuta received several rounds of small arms fire and

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

returned the same. The officers found the fishing vessel, empty except for its engine, and so they returned to the Yabuta. While they were gone the Yabuta had run aground, so another Yabuta had to be dispatched to the scene to free the grounded junk.

On the morning of 16 July, a tragedy occurred near the CG 14 OP Base. At 0945H, CG 14 notified CSC DaNang that USS OKLAHOMA (CLG-5) was firing extremely close (50-100 meters) to the OP base. The ship promptly ceased fire, but not before four rounds landed close to the village adjoining the OP base, wounding four civilians, two seriously. An investigation as to responsibility for the accident was being conducted at the month's close.

On 17 July, another incident occurred involving CG 14 personnel when a sensor team, attempting an implant at BT 141 531, received automatic weapons fire from a small enemy force. Regional forces suppressed the fire with M-16, M-79, M-60, and 60mm mortar fire, and then maneuvered to flank the enemy position. The RFs moved to a tree line at BT 142 531, finding one bunker. Further inspection was halted when a friendly mortar round fell short, seriously wounding one

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

RF. All units then withdrew to the insertion point for medevac.

Enemy casualties were undetermined.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

SECOND COASTAL ZONE

The enemy continued to maintain a moderate level of military operations involving sapper probes, ambushes, and standoff ABFs in the Second Coastal Zone during July. "Cloud" operations continued in full swing with a task unit in the North and a task element in the South providing coverage in high infiltration threat areas. Also during the month, several probable sub contacts in the Vung Ro Bay area, coupled with an intelligence report lent credence to the fact that the North Vietnamese may be trying to infiltrate supplies into the Vung Ro Bay area by submarine. Harbor security was again a primary concern throughout the Second Coastal Zone. Three barges were destroyed in Qui Nhon by water sappers, and two suspected sappers were captured in Cam Ranh Bay. In addition, the USS COHOES (ANL-78) completed salvage operations on the mined SS AMERICAN HAWK, also in Qui Nhon, as the month drew to a close.

Two "Cloud" task units were underway in the Second Coastal Zone during July. A northern unit, designated Task Unit 213.2.3, composed of, on the average, one PGM, two WPB, and three PCFs patrolled areas 3-I and 4-C. The southern unit, designated Task Element 213.2.2.1, composed of a PGM and three PCFs, patrolled area 5-C. Both units continued to improve throughout

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

the month in patrol procedures, unit coordination, and communications security. The one common problem in "Cloud" operations was the lack of experience in unit coordination by the relatively junior officer OTCs.

With the new "Cloud" units increasing the effectiveness of the Inner Barrier, the North Vietnamese may have found another way to infiltrate supplies to their troops in RVN. At 1800H on 18 July, two VNAF Skyraiders engaged an unidentified submarine at CQ 280 420.¹ The submarine returned fire and dived. At 1830H, at CQ 330 210, PGM 611, on patrol of the Vung Ro Bay area, reported sighting an object ten inches high and 20 inches wide moving through the water on an estimated easterly course at speed ten knots. CTF 115 sent an aircraft to investigate and the aircraft reported a probable diesel submarine at 12-50N 110-16E at 2328H. Furthermore, a Second Coastal Zone IO source reported that at 1800H on 13 July, a NVN submarine, about 39 meters in length, painted black, infiltrated territorial waters in the vicinity of CQ 316 286. It was sighted for five minutes and then disappeared. This report was rated as to source; fairly

1. NILO Qui Nhon PERINTREP (14-71) 200700Z JUL 71

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

reliable, information; probably true.¹

Successful enemy sapper activities in Second Coastal Zone harbors during the past few months focused concern in the area of harbor defense. In Cam Ranh Bay, the overall harbor defense posture decreased since the division of harbor responsibility in December 1970, due to the inability or reluctance of the National Maritime Police and Coastal Group 26 to effectively patrol their assigned areas of the harbor.² Military areas of responsibility still are patrolled by Harbor Defense Unit, CRB. The Army Ammunition Piers at Cam Ranh, presently protected against swimmer/sapper attacks by Project Short Time, have requested three PADD (Portable Acoustic Doppler Detectors) units for mid September, after Project Short Time stands down. The redeployment of ISDS (Improved Swimmer Defense System) from Tan Chau to Cam Ranh is also being considered as a replacement for Short Time. Spotlighting the issue, on 10 July, USN Neptune patrol boats spotted two suspicious suspects on the shoreline of Upper Cam Ranh Harbor, across the harbor from the NAF. One suspect tried to evade but stopped upon being challenged

1. 2nd CZ IO msg 241020Z JUL 71

2. SA CTF 213 msg 191245Z JUL 71

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

a second time. Neither man had ID papers, and between the two, were carrying three fragmentation grenades and one rocket fuze. The suspects were turned over to the National Police.

Nha Trang and Qui Nhon also reported problems in the areas of harbor security. The problem was more acute at Qui Nhon, where three merchant ships have been mined within the past 15 months. Two PADD devices are currently employed (one at the north end of De Long Pier, the second in a patrol skimmer), and these were instrumental in night detection of a swimmer on 30 June and on 3 July. The latter detection was confirmed by visual sighting, however, the resultant PBR chase proved in vain. Four additional PADD units are expected in the near future. Each unit requires four persons for operation and maintenance.

At 2356H on 25 July, another incident occurred at Qui Nhon. Two explosions sank three ammunition storage barges (vic. CR 100 244). Fortunately, the barges were empty except for some scrap lumber. The explosions were probably caused by satchel charges.

USS COHOES (ANL-78) completed salvage operations on the SS AMERICAN HAWK at Qui Nhon on 28 July. Much of the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

month's work involved construction and welding of an external patch, dewatering of flooded compartments, and the off-loading of NSFO from the stricken vessel. In spite of this busy work schedule, USS COHOES found the time to respond to a distress signal on 2 July from the Liberian tug FERRY. The tug had a barge alongside, taking on water and in danger of sinking. The COHOES immediately went alongside and began pumping out the barge. Repair work was completed the next morning.

In a miscellaneous incident at 1415H on 21 July, a PA&E worker welding a hinge to a metal door frame inside the Naval Communications Station, Cam Ranh Bay transmitter site, ignited the styrofoam insulation between the metal outer and inner walls. Local personnel began fighting the fire immediately, however, the remote location, unfamiliarity with the area, and the requirement to bring water to the area hampered their efforts. Army and Air Force water trucks were called for help and the fire was quickly brought under control. Damage was limited because the fire was contained between the inner and outer walls. All circuitry was back on the air at 1724H without any noticeable problems.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THIRD COASTAL ZONE

The major concern during the month in the Third Coastal Zone was the interdiction of coastal activity in the estuaries and open waters off the Long Toan, Thanh Phu, and Binh Dai Secret Zones. These transshipments were believed to be of small quantities shipped in small, shallow draft craft from the Long Toan to the Thanh Phu to the Binh Dai and thence inland into Kien Hoa Province. On 30 June, 1971, the Third Coastal Zone "cloud" operations began with the activation of Task Unit 213.3.1. CTU 213.3.1 was tasked with "the mission of conducting intensive coordinated waterborne sweeps, checks, and searches of all craft plying the coastal waters and estuaries around and between the secret zones". Furthermore, CTU 213.3.1 was tasked to "conduct coastal air reconnaissance of the secret zones and adjacent coastal waters"; to "conduct planned air missions into secret zones"; and, to "develop coordination with ground and VNN forces to insure all waterways connecting and contained within the secret zones are interdicted".¹

The task unit assets assigned were:

- (a) 1 USN LST (USS WESTCHESTER COUNTY LST 1167)
- (b) 2 VNN PCF divisions (6 craft)

1. SA 213.3 msg 011031Z JUL 71

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

- (c) HAL 3 Detachment 9 (2 UH1-M Seawolf gunships)
- (d) 1 SEALORD helicopter available on request for VAR (visual air reconnaissance)
- (e) VNN Coastal Groups 33, 34, 35, 36 (36 junks)

The LST, WESTCHESTER COUNTY was employed as the mother ship to the PCF divisions (providing fuel, water, and food to the crews) and as a command and control platform for CTU 213.3.1, and as a NGFS ship mounting 3"/50 caliber guns.

While the task unit was supposedly Vietnamese commanded, US Navy advisors exercised considerable control due to the US assets involved in this operation. A joint staff was formed for CTU 213.3.1, with either the Third Coastal Zone Advisor, Senior Advisor COSFLOT 3 or Senior Advisor COSFLOT 5 assigned to duties afloat with the staff. Operations were going so well by the end of the month that COMNAVFORV directed SA CTF 213 and SA VNN Fleet Command to initiate planning for a VNN ship (HEC/DER) to assume the role as the command and control platform and the support ship to the PCFs.

As an example of the numerous successful operations conducted by the task unit during the month, a combined operation was held on 23 July involving four CG 34 junks,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

troops from the 233rd RF Company, and the two Seawolf helicopters of HAL 3 Detachment 9. The troops were inserted by junk at coordinates XS 724 990 at 0700H. At 0705H, Seawolves spotted a cache of 55 gallon gasoline drums at XS 725 993, and put a strike on them, destroying four of the six drums. The remaining drums were destroyed by the RF troops. The troops continued their sweep, contacting an unknown number of VC at XS 722 995, killing three and destroying one CKC rifle. At 1010H, the junks extracted the troops at XS 715 009, completing the operation. Three U.S. Navy advisors participated. There were no friendly casualties.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

FOURTH COASTAL ZONE

Cloud operations were the main focus of attention in the Fourth Coastal Zone during July. The cloud units have been operating more or less independently, waiting for intelligence upon which to act in order to form clouds. This was difficult to do for accurate intelligence could not be obtained soon enough, and problems with communications hampered coordination efforts. It was decided that the greatest threat areas of infiltration were the lower Ca Mau Peninsula, the Rach Gia Bay area, and the Ha Tien area. This led to the formation of three cloud groups in these areas.

The first group, designated Task Unit 213.4.1 was formed with the Commanding Officer, CG 43, Hon Tre Island, as the task unit commander. Three PCFs were removed from the Phu Quoc patrol (areas 9I, 9K, and 9K1) in order to bring total assets up to six PCFs and six junks, and were placed under the control of CTU 213.4.1. Operations envisioned three PCFs and three junks continuously on station. The junks were to be placed at 300 yard intervals from VS 845 195 to VS 840 190, while the PCFs were to be stationed at 2000 yard intervals from VS 840 190 to VS 840 130. The remaining three junks and three PCFs were to stage out of Hon Tre to provide on

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REF ID: A66030
DECLASSIFIED

station reliefs.

On 8 July, at the request of Commanding General 21st ARVN Division and VNN CNO, one PCF and one junk were detached from TU 213.4.1, and one PGM from patrol area 9D in order to patrol a transshipment infiltration area at the southern shore of Rach Gia Bay, VR 980 930 to VR 860 820. This force was essentially a free moving cloud patrolling a landing area vice a traffic control point, as was done in the northern unit. This was done because the VC had less flexibility in diverting around the patrol area.

Thus the formation of this southern group left two PCFs and two junks continuously on station in the northern Three Sisters area in a barrier line oriented about VS 845 195, VS 840 190 and VS 840 130. The junks manned the inshore leg of the barrier at 500 meter intervals, and the PCFs the seaward leg at intervals of 1000 meters. The general north/south orientation of the barrier line was designed to screen traffic considered by the Fourth Coastal Zone Commander to move from west to east around the Three Sisters shoreline to get further into the bay before taking departure from the shoreline.

The second cloud group, formed on 12 July, and designated

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Task Unit 213.4.2, had as its OTC the Commanding Officer of CG 44 at Ha Tien. The cloud unit's assets included six PCFs and two coastal raiders. Three PCFs and one coastal raider were to remain on station continuously. The coastal raider was to be stationed at a traffic control point determined by the on-scene commander, to observe all traffic. The PCFs were to operate in a moving cloud downstream from the raider, checking traffic and responding to information from the raider.

The third cloud group had, perhaps, the most difficult job. The group, designated Task Unit 213.4.3, was tasked with patrolling the high infiltration threat area off the southern Ca Mau Peninsula. This cloud utilized assets formerly assigned to areas 8C, D, E, and 9C. The unit commander was to be an outer barrier HEC/PCE skipper. However, these outer barrier assets were available for only short periods of time. For example, on 17 July, the HEC/PCE unit chopped back to CTF 213, leaving a relatively junior WPB commanding officer as OTC with the attendant coordination problems discussed in the First and Second Coastal Zone sections. Also, the departure of the outer barrier unit seriously degraded task unit communications. On 22 July, the VNN CNO agreed to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

the retention of HEC/PCE commanding officers as CTU. However, the unit would remain in the outer barrier, while the senior WPB/PCF skipper was designated as CTE and on-scene commander. Both CTU and CTE were to have continual communications with CTG 214.2 at Nam Can in order to receive intelligence.

Task Unit 213.4.3 was further subdivided into two groups. One group was to operate as a mobile patrol in the area between the Bo De and Ganh Hao Rivers, while the second group would form a mobile patrol in the Mue Ya Quan area. Each group was to consist of two WPB/PGMs and was to remain on station four days at a time.

There was some discussion at month's end about embarking CTU 213.4.1 and CTU 213.4.2 with their respective clouds. However, a strong argument against this was the lack of reliable communications between the afloat units and the Fourth Coastal Zone Commander. The CTUs, shore based, could better pass information between the clouds and the Fourth Coastal Zone Commander with their more reliable communications facilities.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION SUMMARY

The primary objective of the U.S. Navy PSYOPS effort in Vietnam is to assist the Vietnamese in acquiring the capability of conducting their own PSYOPS. To further this aim, Beach Jumper Unit 1 Team 13 will stand down in early August. During July, much of the BJU equipment was being turned into N-9 COMNAVFORV for routine maintenance. After this maintenance, N-9 will sub-custody this equipment to the senior POLWAR advisors attached to the various commands throughout Vietnam for use by the VNN in conducting PSYOPS throughout their respective AOs. At a later date to be announced, this equipment will be turned over to the VNN POLWAR bloc. The following is a listing of BJU-1 Team 13 detachments and a resume of their activities during July:

<u>Element</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Assigned to</u>
HQ team	Binh Thuy	2off/4enl	CTF 116
Psyops Det	Vinh Long	1enl	Nilo, Vinh Long
Psyops Det *	Ben Tre	1enl	Nilo, Ben Tre
Psyops Det	Chau Doc	1enl	Nilo, Chau Doc
Psyops Det	My Tho	1enl	Nilo, My Tho
Psyops Det	Rach Gia	2enl	SA, CTG 212.5
Psyops Det	Ca Mau	2enl	SA, CTG 210
equipment loan	RSSZ	none	POLWAR Adv, RSSZ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

equipment loan	DaNang	none	POLWAR Adv, I.CZ 214.2
equipment loan	Solid Anchor	none	POLWAR Adv, CTG 214.2
Psyops Det**	Cao Lanh	loff/lenl	Nilo, Cao Lanh

* Detachment disestablished mid July

** Detachment established mid July

At Binh Thuy, BJU personnel were mainly involved in planning and maintenance. A BJU representative, along with the NAVLECORDS PSYOPS officer visited all the BJU detachments and inspected the progress of training the Vietnamese on operation and maintenance of PSYOPS equipment. While VNN interest in PSYOPS was still hesitant and tentative, other agency interest was high (vis. National Police, Phung Hoang, Sector POLWAR); the purpose of the visit was to connect these active groups with personnel on the US/VNN side who will receive the BJU loudspeaker equipment, and to form a basis for future cooperation so use of PSYOPS gear can be expanded.

The detachment at Vinh Long conducted operations totaling 21 1/4 broadcast hours during July. The team conducted four helo broadcast missions targeting six districts with general Chieu Hoi themes. The team also conducted five vehicle broadcast missions targeting five districts with Chieu Hoi themes, and one waterborne broadcast mission targeting three districts with a general Chieu Hoi theme, and themes concerning refusal to pay VC taxes. All equipment was set up and operated by VNN personnel on all the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

operations. The BJU operator accompanied the team in a purely advisory capacity. These PSYOPS missions resulted in 19 Hoi Chanh for the month; four others rallied from Sa Dec as a result of a BJU PSYOPS broadcast using a new high ranging Hoi Chanh tape.

The Chau Doc team operated for 144 hours with PBR and PCF craft in districts and canals on both sides of the Mekong River below the Cambodian border. These operations involved a total of 21 broadcast hours utilizing tapes with general Chieu Hoi, specific NVA Chieu Hoi, PSDF, blacklists, land titular, and harassment themes. One quick reaction mission using a 250 watt backpack set in support of the Olam City Public Health Service was run. This mission utilized programs with themes of mosquito control, noncontaminated water usage, blacklist, pro-GVN, PSDF, and land titular. Nine Hoi Chanh were received at Chau Doc during the month, seven of them directly attributable to PSYOPS.

The My Tho Detachment reported nine broadcast hours for the month, six of those involving preplanned tape and live broadcasts with a 1400 watt system around Ben Tre and My Tho, utilized in conjunction with Marine Police boats. At the My Tho Detachment, over 20 Vietnamese were trained in use of BJU PSYOPS gear.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

The Rach Gia Detachment was extremely active throughout the month. The team carried out 22 1/2 hours of broadcasting by boat and vehicle utilizing general VCI themes. Three missions with a 250 watt system mounted on a jeep, were conducted targeting villages with Phung Hoang and Chieu Hoi inducement themes, and also targeting district level VC finance and economy cadre. One mission was conducted using a 1400 watt system mounted on a Marine Police boat along the Cai Lon for purposes of Phung Hoang exposure (Phung Hoang is called "Phoenix" by the Americans and is an intelligence program directed at VCI) and Chieu Hoi rallying. Two hundred posters were also put up, and 20,000 leaflets and 1250 pamphlets distributed. Two preplanned missions with the Marine Police in Kien Thang District were carried out, involving broadcasts with Chieu Hoi inducement themes, and with a theme targeting ten known VCI in the area. In the period 4-10 July alone, the Rach Gia Detachment reported 44 Hoi Chanhs, five directly attributable to PSYOPS.

The Ca Mau Detachment also had highly successful results during July. The team conducted 11 hours of broadcasts with voluntary informant and narcotics penalties themes. The team also conducted five interesting night harassment missions over suspected VC camps around the Little Square Bay area near Solid Anchor. These missions utilized tapes with themes such as a crying baby, wandering soul,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

laughter, and U.S. acid rock and country and western music. A recent Hoi Chanh interview with Tran Van Be, guerrilla member, who rallied on 5 July, indicated that, in addition to not believing VC propaganda any more, PSYOPS played a large part in his decision to rally. The Hoi Chanh stated that just prior to rallying he heard three PSYOPS programs from a helo on general Chieu Hoi themes. This Hoi Chanh later led the 21st ARVN Division on a successful operation capturing one 80mm mortar, seven 60mm mortars, two .30 caliber machine guns, one rocket launcher, one LMG, two SMG (K-50), two SMG (M), 16 Mausers, nine K44 rifles, eight MAS 36 rifles, and one ton of explosives.

PSYOPS was not confined to the Delta in July. In a message on 20 July, SA CTG 213 requested a report of current and planned PSYOPS programs from his coastal zone advisors. In general, the coastal zone programs consisted of face to face leaflet/pamphlet/poster distribution by coastal group patrol and MEDCAP teams. Some broadcasting was being done; also, air leaflet drops were planned.

The program in the First Coastal Zone was, by far, the most advanced, utilizing broadcast equipment on loan from BJU-1. For example, a PSYOPS team conducted a broadcast on the Cua Viet on 24 July covering anti-mine, Chieu Hoi, and associated themes. This

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

broadcast bore immediate results, for on 26 July, a VN boy reported two anti-tank mines, one CHICOM grenade, and one case of pull friction fuses to a CG 11 junk. ALSO, on 28 July, a boy brought one anti-tank mine to the CG 11 OP Base and was paid 2,500 piasters from the VIP funds. Later that afternoon, another boy found an anti-tank mine and turned it over to a CG 11 junk. This boy also received 2,500 piasters from VIP funds. Finally, on 29 July, another boy found a Russian TM-41 anti-tank mine and turned it in to a Yabuta on patrol. The youth was also paid 2,500 piasters from the VIP funds.

MARKET TIME units were also active in the field of civic action projects. USCGC MORGENTHAU was very active in the Fourth Coastal Zone, sometimes conducting as many as three and four MEDCAPS each week. The Fourth Coastal Zone PSYOPS Advisor frequently accompanied the MEDCAP teams to act as liaison, to develop personal contacts, to provide preventive medicine for livestock and pets, and to initiate civic action projects. The following is a recount of some of the highlights from MORGENTHAU's MEDCAPS: 6 July, Pouli Obi Island, four hours, 34 patients treated; 7 July, Hon Thom, 3 hours, 20 patients treated during a howling gale; 8 July, Hon Panjang, 7 hours, 35 patients treated; 9 July, Hon Rai, 8 hours, 279 patients treated; 10 July, Poulo Dama, 9 hours, 106

CONFIDENTIAL



Petty Officer Second Class Melvain Sturdivant shows off a 15-minute-old piglet born at the Task Force 115 hog farm at Cam Ranh Bay. Sturdivant and three other U.S. Navymen are currently training Vietnamese sailors to take over their facility which began operations in September of 1969, and until May 1971, was the only OHH distribution center in Vietnam.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

patients treated; and finally, 13 July, Hon Rai (north side), five hours, 148 patients treated.

Also in the field of community and civic action projects, ISB Qui Nhon reported continuing medical and financial support for St. Paul's Orphanage in the city of Qui Nhon. Despite increasing pressure from the ISB's own VNN hog feeding program, the orphanage was still receiving edible garbage three times a week from the base to support the orphanage's hog feeding program, its primary source of income. ISB Qui Nhon has also provided assistance in procuring and showing Vietnamese and suitable U.S. movies for the dependent community. A VN movie operator has been trained and a projector is being salvaged for direct turnover to the community. The ISB also modified a building in the dependent community to provide a school for 84 children. The base also built necessary furnishings including desks, benches, and black boards.

In July, CTG 214.2 moved to initiate a swine program for the Nam Can area. ISB Nam Can requested a pilot program of one gilt, one boar, and two feeder pigs. The Biet Hai Naval Rangers ordered one gilt and two feeder pigs. The boar ordered by the ISB was to be shared with the Biet Hai.

In the Dependent Shelter Program, Seabees of CBMU 302 and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Petty Officer Third Class John B. Moran, a Navy Seabee, puts his masonry skills to work on a dependent shelter project at Cat Lai.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

volunteers from Advisory Team 159 contributed significantly to an excellent US/Vietnamese relationship in An Thoi Village during July. Recent civic action work included assistance in digging a drainage ditch and installing a culvert to accommodate the village main street. Recent projects have included hauling sand, gravel and rocks for home construction, and pouring cement frontage for village stores and homes.

On 17 July, a 15 man detachment of CBMU 302 was ordered to OP Base Chu Lai in Military Region One in order to construct 16 new dependent shelters on an existing concrete slab, and to improve drainage of existing shelters. The detachment was to arrive in early August and was scheduled to remain there about three months.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SUMMARY

The logistics support aspect of the ACTOV program reached a halfway mark during the month of July. Eighteen of the 34 support bases had been turned over, with 98 craft remaining to be turned over by the end of July. The turnover of craft in other areas had been essentially completed, with 138 coastal surveillance craft already turned over, and only one ship remaining for turnover, the DER USS FORSTER. All 293 river security craft, all 224 river assault craft, and all 107 harbor and mine defense craft had already been turned over. The first operational ACTOVRAD site was turned over on 7 July.

Fifteen craft were turned over during the month, with logistics support craft in the majority. On 1 July, the yard repair craft YR-71 was transferred at Tan Chau. More than 120 U.S. Navymen spent two months preparing for the YR-71 turnover. During that time, VNN sailors were brought aboard to be trained. As they became proficient in repair skills, Americans left. Five U.S. Navymen remained on board as advisors at the time of turnover. Three other yard repair craft had been transferred in addition to the 155-foot craft. Also on the first of the month, the USS MARK (AKL-12) was leased to the Chinese Navy in Taiwan. On 14 July,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

two LCM-6s were turned over at DaNang. On 28 July, six USARV PBRs and their mission were turned over to the VNN at Qui Nhon. On 30 July the Fleet Command at Nha Be received the refrigerator craft, YFU-90, and on 31 July received one LCM-8 and four LCM-6s.

The heavy pace of training continued unabated during July, in the effort to bring qualified men into positions where the ACTOV program required them. During the month, 294 VNN enlisted men graduated from various schools at the VNNTC at Nha Trang. On 10 July, five officers and 23 enlisted men of the Cambodian Navy arrived at the PBR MoBase II for six weeks training in base maintenance and boat repair. On 16 July the VNN OCS Class number 11 graduated at Newport, Rhode Island. On 24 July, 211 enlisted men graduated from various rating classes at the NTC at Cam Ranh Bay. On 30 July, at the NTC in Saigon, 54 OCS candidates, just returned from Newport, were designated aspirants by RADM Chon, CNO, VNN. As the 10th of 12 classes to graduate, they brought the total to 604 men having completed the OCS training program.

The vanguard ACTOVRAD station at Vung Tau commenced operations on 1 July and was turned over on the seventh. The

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Vietnamese crew manning the site had been in training since 1 March. The motivation was reported as high among teachers and students alike, as the ACTOVRAD designated personnel were considered a cut above the average VNN man. All of the 15 sites are scheduled for operation by the end of June, 1972. The sites are being built for direct turnover to the Vietnamese by Seabees and civilian firms.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTOVLOG



* Base already turned over

NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SAIGON

Several aggressive measures were taken during July to bolster the clearly flagging Vietnamese Navy supply system. RADM W.R. Dowd, Jr., SC, called in to country in June, gave extensive counsel on the VNN logistics support situation. RADM Salzer, COMNAVFORV, also took to the road to review the situation in the TRAN HUNG DAO II AO, arriving at ATSBs Tra Cu and Go Dau Ha on 21 July. It was noted that very poor supply support was being given to the ATSBs by ISB Ben Luc. In particular, spare parts were not being received in a timely fashion, thereby severely hampering repair and PMS efforts. It was decided to disband the Moc Hoa rear base, also in the AO, which had been disestablished on 16 July for tactical reasons. Orders were given to ISB Ben Luc to shift personnel and facilities at Moc Hoa to ATSB Tuyen Nhon at month's end. An NSAS referendum taken in July throughout the support base structure of the VNN revealed advisor confidence in the Vietnamese handling of normal maintenance and repair, with reservations as to the depth of their technical experience.

The Accelerated Overhaul program continued satisfactorily in July, ensuring that with USN departures, an operational VN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Navy would indeed be on the rivers and not languishing at dockside. The program was in some areas delayed when repair parts were a long time arriving, and the Vietnamese had to learn to handle this typically ambitious American-style operation. At LSB Binh Thuy, the repair effort was, at first, largely ineffective due to the shotgun approach of trying to work on all the boats at once. The disorder was due to the magnitude of the projects underway, with poor progress reporting and quality control evinced. The advisors at Binh Thuy then established a boat pipeline (a la General Motors) to direct all attention on timely completion of a small group of boats vice the previous method of spreading resources over all boats awaiting availability. SA LSB Binh Thuy voiced another shortcoming in the overhaul arena, the drain on USN personnel due to the withdrawal: "The pace of the accelerated overhaul program, coupled with the need for more intensive supervision of VNN logistics activities has created a critical need for the assignment of additional storekeepers to this command."¹

Functioning in full-time USN supply billets, the six NAG SK personnel assigned could only act as token advisors, while

1. SA LSB Binh Thuymsg210850Z July 71

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the need for NAG supply personnel to become fully involved in VNN logistics was described as acute. It was noted that one year earlier, in 1970, the Binh Thuy supply department was manned by 30-35 USN SKs tasked with providing repair part support to PBR craft. In July, 1971, the USN supply department had to provide repair part support not only for PBRs but for all varieties of heavy boats under the Accelerated Overhaul Program, with only eight NSA and six NAG SK personnel. Discounting completely the advisory aspect of the logistics business, the workload had magnified while staffing was drastically decreased. Moreover, RADM Dowd had visited Binh Thuy on 19 July and decided that they would undertake full repair support of ISB Rach Soi and Long Xuyen as well. The VNN SK counterparts were sufficiently numerous, but were of more value as trainees due to their absolute lack of experience. It was felt that 19 additional USN SKs would be required to have an effective supply system, though this would be an evident reverse in Vietnamization.

Shortages in USN personnel were felt elsewhere, as the USS SATYR was extended in country for the Accelerated Overhaul Program while experiencing a deterioration in

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

manning levels, making it impossible to accomplish ships force work previously accepted. The COMNAVFORV Overhaul Coordinator estimated that the cost impact of tasking SRF Guam to accomplish the SATYR's essential ships force items would be approximately 450,000 dollars. The greatest loss increment of personnel on the SATYR occurred as personnel completed their Vietnam tours and replacements were not forthcoming. The overhaul program had reassuring moments, however, and RADM McManus was quick to point one of them out. COMNAVSUPPACT msg 210522Z July 71 cited LSB Nla Be: "8,300 man hours were required to bring eight LCMs to turnover standards. The ability to work this in to the already heavy workload, perpetrated by the Accelerated Overhaul Program, exemplifies the outstanding leadership of LT Moore and the professional performance of the entire repair department."

On 15 July, the Newport throughput stevedore strike was finally settled, after a prolonged period with marginal unloading services for the capital city's port. Since the beginning of a work stoppage on 22 June, the Newport throughput capability was reduced by approximately 50

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

percent creating a backlog of ships awaiting discharge, and slowing the movement of cargo into and out of the port. At the end of the strike, there were some 23,000 short tons of cargo awaiting movement. Of this, 6,000 short tons were retrograde equipment. Between the 15th and the end of the month, there were an estimated 50 ship wait days, eight of which were with deep draft vessels; operations of other port areas in Vietnam were also adversely affected by the disruption of the scheduled arrival of ships from Newport which had calls elsewhere in the country. Operation of the Newport port required 1,100 personnel. During the strike the Saigon Supply Command had mustered 150 military personnel and 300 contractor personnel to fill in, but in anticipation of an extended layoff, MACV personnel were being selected for emergency service. The timely accord reached by the Trieu Tiet Stevedoring Company, the Ministry of Labor, and worker representatives on 15 July, made the employment of MACV personnel unnecessary. NAVFORV supplied 46 personnel who could help fill the gap. By 16 July, approximately 70 percent of the required work force had returned to Newport.

CONFIDENTIAL

U.S. Naval Support Activity maintenance and repair

support for July was as follows:

<u>Base</u>	<u>Personnel supported</u>	<u>Craft supported</u>
Nha Be	2,442	231
Binh Thuy	2,175	132
DaNang	1,735	0
Cat Lo	130	46
Dong Tam	887	5
MoBase II	109	17
YRBM 21	229	80
Cam Ranh Bay	1,409	151
USS KRISHNA	163	0

NSAS support ships deployed during the month were as follows:

USS ASKARI (ARL 30)	Dong Tam
USS SATYR (ARL 23)	Long Xuyen
USS TUTUILLA (ARG 4)	Nha Be
USS KRISHNA (ARL 38)	Binh Thuy
USS WESTCHESTER COUNTY	YS 00 00, 31 July outchop
USS BRULE	Delta resupply
APL 21	Nha Be
APL 30	Nha Be
YRBM 21	Tan Chau
YF 866	Nha Be
PBR MoBase II	Tan An

The NAVFORV drug amnesty program, begun on 1 June, had by the end of July, admitted 110 patients at the drug rehabilitation center at LSB Nha Be. Another ten Navy personnel in Vietnam were granted amnesty, but were designated experimental users and sent back to duty without entering the center. Of the 65 men having completed the center's program, four returned to duty in Vietnam at

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

their own request. All the others were sent to the Navy Rehabilitation Center at Miramar, California: five to await discharge; two to await reassignment in the U.S.; and 54 to receive further evaluation, further rehabilitation, or both.

The comprehensive NAVFORV program included: drug education throughout Vietnam and off the coast down to the lowest level, with teams reaching the Navy personnel to discuss the problems of drug abuse; information on the dangers of drugs daily disseminated to the Navy men in circulars, PODs, messages, and at quarters; spot checks of living quarters taken at virtually all U.S. naval units in Vietnam, with lockers sometimes being opened; urine tests given to all departing servicemen to determine opium content, under the broader Army program; rigid customs inspections, aided by sniffing dogs, to prevent the smuggling of the drugs back to the U.S.; and the most crucial phase, the actual rehabilitation, both physical and in attitude.

The NAVFORV program is but a part of the overall effort in Vietnam and in the U.S. Indeed, President Nixon carried the "offensive" around the world in buying Turkey's entire opium crop. In the President's news conference of 17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

June, he asserted his stand as waging an all out offensive on the "public enemy number one.", getting 350 million dollars for the program and promising that one of the major inlets of the problem-G.I.s returning from Vietnam would be especially combatted. In this light, he asked Congress to increase the VA budget by 14 million dollars to initiate a drug rehabilitation program at VA hospitals. He cited the remarkable differences between the stateside and Vietnam drug problem: In Vietnam, heroin is cheap and 95 percent pure, and its effects are commonly achieved through smoking or snorting the drug, while in the U.S., the drug is impure, consisting of only about five percent heroin; it has to be main-lined or injected into the bloodstream to achieve a comparable effect. Further, a habit which costs five dollars a day to maintain in Vietnam can cost 100 dollars a day to maintain in the U.S.

In comparing the various service programs, 460 Army members were undergoing detoxification at any one time, as compared to the 100 Navy and 350 Air Force members. The Navy, consequently, had the opportunity to develop a more homespun and personalized program, generally

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

considered more likely to succeed than the more massive Army program. The NAVFORV drug rehabilitation center is on the APL-30, where the inmates are physically removed from the source of drugs and the opportunity for drug abuse. The program is one of intensive personal counselling and group discussions which breaks down the element of distrust commonly felt by the drug users, and induces the man to seek within himself a solution, and to seek further rehabilitation elsewhere.

Patients arriving at the center spend from one to four days in a security area undergoing detoxification and testing. Most have smoked or "snorted" heroin, some as much as four or five vials per day. Only one so far has taken it by injection. There was a lull in applicants for the amnesty program in the beginning of July, as the drug users waited for feedback from the rehabilitation center, but as the word was passed that it was a sincere and well-directed program, the applications increased considerably. As four Blacks had applied for the program, it was felt that the counselling staff should contain Blacks, who would be more understanding of the Black feelings.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

The last of the month saw a series of tragedies befall NSAS personnel, from varied causes. On 21 July at the NSAS Detachment Qui Nhon, SH2 Harold B. Flynn apparently attempted to commit suicide while lying on his bed in the berthing spaces. At 1000H he was discovered unconscious with a self-inflicted .45 caliber head wound behind his right ear. Flynn underwent follow-on surgery 34 hours later, but the prognosis for life was not hopeful.

Navy personnel driving in Vietnam are always exposed to hazards from the anarchic conditions that reign on the roads. While several traffic accidents occurred during the month involving naval personnel, two proved fatal. On 18 July FTGSN Stewart L. Herbst was driving a Navy bus to the Annapolis BEQ, traveling at 15 MPH, when a Vietnamese on a motorcycle attempted to pass him on the left side. The victim cut in too quickly and hooked the left bumper of the bus, causing himself to be thrown onto the pavement in front of the bus, which passed over his body, causing immediate death. The limited hostile reaction by the local populace was brought under control by the authorities.

On 23 July at 2130H BM1 Arthur R. Streeper was driving a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Navy Ford pickup, proceeding towards the Long Binh stockade on the Bien Hoa Highway, in the vicinity of Gate #2, when a motorcycle, carrying the operator and a female passenger, attempted to pass him on the left side. Upon reaching a point just ahead of the U.S. vehicle, the motorcycle swerved to the right to avoid another motorcycle and collided with the left front of the Ford pickup, causing the victims to be knocked to the pavement. Because of the traffic to the immediate front, rear and right, BM 1 Streeper was unable to stop and proceeded approximately one mile from the scene of the accident before halting. The two Vietnamese died at the scene, while the uninjured BM 1 Streeper, a mile down the road, confronted three enraged VN soldiers, who struck him approximately five times before VN police authorities could bring the situation under control.

As in the previous month, drinking appeared to have resulted in the drowning of a U.S. sailor. At 0215H on 26 July, EN 2 Clifford F. Dowling, an advisor for RAID 71, fell overboard from an ATC alongside the USS SATYR. At the time, the quarterdeck watch on the SATYR, making the rounds on the AMMI's moored alongside, heard a splash and a cry for help.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The watch called out "man overboard" and proceeded to the aft end of the after docking AMMI. The OOD on the bridge illuminated the water and located a man approximately 30 yards astern. A SATYR patrol boat off the ship's bow was ordered astern to effect rescue. Dowling was seen to go under twice by the bridge and quarterdeck watches and was not seen to come up again. The second time he went under at 0218H, he was approximately 70 yards astern, and the patrol boat was just clearing the after AMMI at full speed, being directed by the bridge searchlight to the spot where Dowling last went under. The patrol boat conducted a 20 minute search with negative results. A second search was conducted from 0310H to 0415H along the west bank with negative results. Investigation disclosed that Dowling had been drinking, but was not considered overly intoxicated, though earlier he had gone aft to vomit during a conversation he had with a Vietnamese counterpart. Dowling had finished the conversation with the Vietnamese after midnight and then went aft to the flight deck to sleep, while still fully clothed. The current was around five knots at the time, with the closest shore being 600 yards away. The VNN asked the local fishermen to watch for the body.

On 27 July, an American seaman fell to an ally's bullet in a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Saigon bar. SKSN Robert E. Schulze was imbibing in the back of the Snow Bar with several comrades when some Vietnamese, dressed in army attire, confronted them. Later one of the American sailors was beaten up in front of the bar by the soldiers, his cries falling to deaf ears. As the beaten buddy was crawling back to his comrades, the Vietnamese approached Schulze and forthwith fatally shot him. The event was clouded in uncertainties, aided by the considerable liquor drunk by the sailors.

During the month COMNAVFORV departed Saigon to explore the MARKET TIME Cloud Concept at firsthand. On 23 July, he travelled to Coastal Group 14 at Hoi An, to ACTOVRAD Site #2, and to the OP Base at Hue, to tour the bases and discuss with the advisors the newly formulated Cloud Concept. During the same trip, he toured LSB DaNang, receiving an update on the base repair and logistics situation. RADM W.R. Dowd, Jr., S.C., accompanied by CAPT Dinh of the VNN and CAPT Weiskopf, S.C., toured ISBs Long Xuyen, Cho Moi, and Rach Soi on 19 July, ISB Vinh Long and LSB Dong Tam on 21 July, and LSBs Nha Be and Cat Lo on 23 July, discussing VNN logistics and supply problems. RADM Dowd arrived in-country on 20 June for an extended stay to assist in training and upgrading the VNN supply

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

systems. On 18 July, DEPCOMNAVFORV, RADM Price, toured ATSB Tuyen Nhon pier area and received an operational brief at COSFLOT 5 Headquarters at My Tho.

On 21 July he toured LSB Cat Lo and the Third Riverine Headquarters at OP Base Long Binh, and received an operational brief at ATSB Ben Keo.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCES

During the month, Seabee units in Vietnam, NMCB-5 and CBMU 302, based at Bien Hoa, continued to work at a steady pace on a wide variety of construction and maintenance jobs. Seabees were involved in sporadic combat action, but, fortunately, none of them were killed, and only four were injured.

The first incident of the month occurred on the Phung Hiep Canal at WR 30 23 on 9 July when one LCM-8 and two LCM-6s of Detachment Pinto, NMCB-5, at Binh Thuy, came under mortar fire. Between 10 and 15 rounds impacted near the craft, but there were no personnel or material casualties reported. Earlier on the same day, at 1230H at WR 646 560, the ill fated convoy was struck by a Vietnamese water taxi. The water taxi overturned and one Vietnamese child was drowned, despite repeated attempts by the U.S. sailors to rescue him. All other civilians were rescued and delivered safely to the bank of the canal.

On 13 July, two Seabees of Detachment Mustang were injured when an explosive round of some type landed inside the west boundry of ISB Ca Mau. The two injured men, SF3 James J. Schmidt and BM2 B.F. Lee, were injured running for the bunkers. Schmidt suffered a broken leg and was medevaced while Lee's

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

injuries were minor.

In the most serious combat related incident of the month, a minesweep team of Detachment Bronco, on Route 314, leading to the ACTOVRAD site at Nui Ta Kou, had a five ton dump truck mined, injuring HM1 G.W. Smith and SW3 F.C. Reynolds. The mining took place at 0840H at ZS 140 950. Both men were medevaced to FSB Mace but were returned to duty in less than a week. The mine dog, after missing the mine at 0840H found one later in the morning at ZS 140 959. This mine was blown in place leaving a crater seven feet wide and three feet deep.

On 23 July at 1330H, in An Thoi Village, a Seabee was involved in an incident with a Vietnamese enlisted man. The Vietnamese threw bricks at the Seabee, cutting his lip. The Seabee then drew his knife whereupon various Vietnamese military spectators locked and loaded their weapons. A VNN officer and some local villagers broke up the altercation and as a result, the Seabees were restricted to the base until tempers cooled.

Construction was continuing at ISB Ca Mau (Detail Mustang), and at the ACTOVRAD sites at Mui Dinh (Detail Maverick) and Nui Ta Kou (Detail Bronco). Detail Trotter completed shortfall work at Chau Doc on 25 July, and part of the detail proceeded to Tan Chau while

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

another smaller group went to Cho Moi to install an erdlator.

Detail Colt planned to move to An Khanh (XS 89 93) to construct a footbridge early in August.


Units of CBMU 302 were busily engaged in construction of dependent shelters for the VNN and in maintenance of existing facilities at various USN and VNN bases. Naval Civic Action Teams (NAVCATs) responsible for the construction of dependent housing are located in the following places:

NAVCAT 1	Camp Tien Sha
NAVCAT 2	NSF, Cam Ranh Bay
NAVCAT 6	An Thoi
NAVCAT 8	Cuu Long
NAVCAT 16	NAF, Cam Ranh Bay
NAVCAT 17	Rach Soi
NAVCAT 18	Saigon
NAVCAT 19	Thuan An
NAVCAT 20	Nam Can

Detail Golf of CBMU-302 at Cam Ranh Bay, and liaison teams at various LSBs such as Dong Tam, Cat Lo, Binh Thuy and Ben Luc provided maintenance and repair of facilities, transportation equipment, structures, and utilities systems. They also performed limited construction tasks at the employment sites.

CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION TF 21/22



CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Appendix II

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix III

NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP ORGANIZATION

CHNAVADVGRU U.S. MACV	RADM R.S. SALZER, USN
SENAVADV	CAPT B.G. STONE, USN
SA FLEET COMMAND, SAIGON	CAPT J.F. DRAKE, USN
SA COMD NAVAL COMMAND (SA, CTF 227) SAIGON	LCDR J.H. GAUL, USN

TRAN HUNG DAO CAMPAIGN ADVISORY ORGANIZATION/AREA OPERATION COORDINATORS (AOC)

AOC, COASTAL	SA, CTF 213	CAPT C.R. QUANSTROM, USN(D) CAPT T.I. KOLSTAD, USN (R)
SA, DEPCOMTHD BINH THUY		CAPT W.J. CROWE, USN
AOC, NORTHERN LONG BINH	SA, THIRD RIVERINE AREA	CDR V. MCDONOUGH, USN
SA THD 24 BEN LUC	VNN TG 214.1	LCDR P.S. GESSWEIN, USN
SA THD 5 PHU CUONG	VNN TG 216.1	LCDR W.W. WERNDLI, USN
SA THD 25 TUYEN NHON	VNN TG 212.2	LCDR B. COUSINS, USN (D) LCDR J.C. ROGERS, USN (R)
AOC, EASTERN CAN THO	SA, FOURTH RIVERINE AREA	CDR W. WARDELL, USN
SA THD 8 DONG TAM	VNN TG 217.1	LT K.J. PLIS, USN
SA THD 19 BEN TRE	VNN TG 217.2	LT R.E. BROWN, USN
AOC, SOUTHERN CA MAU	SA AFT 211	CAPT P.C. GIBBONS, USN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SA THD 4 NAM CAN	VNN TG 214.2	CDR H. V. SHORES, USN
SA THD 6 RACH SOI	VNN TG 212.5	LCDR G. STEFENCAVAGE, USN
SA THD 21 CA MAU	VNN TF 210	CAPT W. J. GIBBONS, USN
AOC, WESTERN TAN CHAU	SA COMTHD 18	CDR A. WRIGHT, USN
SA THD 18 TAN CHAU	VNN TF 218	CDR A. WRIGHT, USN
SA THD 20 HA TIEN	VNN TG 219.1	LTJG D. C. SNYDER, USN

AMPHIBIOUS TYPE COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (ATF 211)

SA PHIBCOMD CA MAU	CAPT P. C. GIBBONS, USN
SA RAID SEVEN ZERO KIEN AN	LT R. J. LENDSTEDT, II, USN
SA RAID SEVEN ONE KIEN AN	LT S. L. HOLMES, USN
SA RAID SEVEN TWO KIEN AN	LTJG W. C. KUSTER, USN
SA RAID SEVEN THREE KIEN AN	LT R. C. MONSON, USN
SA RAID SEVEN FOUR CA MAU	LT C. ARMENTROUT, USN
SA RAID SEVEN FIVE CA MAU	LT J. GLUTTING, USN (D) LTJG R. BOLLER, USN (R)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RIVER PATROL TYPE COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 212)

SA RIVPATCOMD BINH THUY	CAPT R.E. SPRUIT, USN
SA RPD FIVE ONE CAT LAI	LT J.M. LAWLESS, USN
SA RPD FIVE TWO PHU CUONG	LT J.R. RECKNER, USN
SA RPD FIVE THREE BEN LUC	LT A. HILDEBRAND, USN (D) LTJG J.R. FRONDORF, USN(R)
SA RPD FIVE FOUR BEN KEO	LT R. ARMITAGE, USN
SA RPD FIVE FIVE TAN CHAU	LT R.E. MOORE, USN
SA RPD FIVE SIX VINH LONG	LT J.B. GIBNEY, USN
SA RPD FIVE SEVEN NHA BE	LT E. HENDRICKSON, USNR
SA RPD FIVE EIGHT SA DEC	LT H.M. HIGHLAND, USN
SA RPD FIVE NINE TAN CHAU	LT W.A. GOODWIN, USN
SA RPD SIX ZERO HOI AN	LT B. WATERMAN, USN
SA RPD SIX ONE RACH SOI	LT J. SCOVILL, USN
SA RPD SIX TWO PHUOC XUYEN	LT P.J. GASKIN, USN
SA RPD SIX THREE RACH SOI	LT R.B. FIORE, USNR
SA RPD SIX FOUR TUYEN NHON	LTJG J.D. COLE, USNR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

COASTAL SURVEILLANCE TYPE COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION
(TF 213)

SA CSCMD
CAM RANH BAY

CAPT C.R. QUANSTROM, USN (D)
CAPT T.I. KOLSTAD, USN (R)

SA COSFLOT ONE
DANANG

LCDR D.C. WILSON, USN

SA COSFLOT TWO
QUI NHON

LT G.H. ROBERTS, USN

SA COSFLOT THREE
VUNG TAU

LCDR R.S. WATKINS, USN

SA COSFLOT FOUR
AN THOI

LCDR J.G. TONTI, USN

SA COSFLOT FIVE
MY THO

LCDR J. MCCORMICK, USN

SA HARDU CRB

LT J.L. JANSEN, USNR (D)
LT P.A. LINTON, USN (R)

GENERAL RESERVE TYPE COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 214)

SA GENRESCOMD
CAT LAI

CAPT L.A. DWYER, USN

SA RTE DIV EIGHT ONE
CAT LAI

LT J.M. STEUSSY, USN

SA MID NINE ONE
CUU LUONG

LT J.W. HAMILTON, USN

SA MID NINE TWO
CUA VIET

LT T.A. COMER, USN

SA MID NINE THREE
NHA BE/TAN CHAU/CA MAU

LT R.F. ELLIOTT, USN

SA SEAL AND UDT UNIT
SAIGON

LT G.W. DORAN, USN

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SA SALVAGE UNIT CAT LAI	LCDR E. H. SHIPP, USN
SA RID FOUR ZERO GO DAU HA	LT R. O. MILHAM, USN
SA RID FOUR ONE TAN CHAU	LT R. A. DORSI, USN
SA RID FOUR TWO DONG TAM	LT C. VOTAVA, USN
SA RID FOUR THREE PHU CUONG	LTJG T. B. WAGENSEIL, USN
SA RID FOUR FOUR TRA CU	LT G. C. COOLEY, USN
SA RID FOUR FIVE DONG TAM	LT C. F. TIBBETTS, USN
SA RID FOUR SIX NAM CAN	LT W. C. SMITH, USN
SA RID FOUR SEVEN NAM CAN	LT W. TAYLOR, USN
SA RID FOUR EIGHT TAN CHAU	LT W. R. RUSLING, USN
SA RAG TWO SEVEN NHA BE	LT W. GOTTSCHALK, USN
<u>FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (CTG 213.1)</u>	
SA FIRST CZ DANANG	CDR P. MCLAIRD, USN
SA CG ONE ONE CUA VIET	LT R. DUMINIAK, USNR
SA CG ONE TWO THUAN AN	LT R. N. MYERS, USN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SA CG ONE THREE
CU TU HIEN

LT J. SCOTT, USN

SA CG ONE FOUR
HOI AN

LTJG R.G. MCCAIN, USN

SA CG ONE FIVE
CHU LAI

LT D. ROBINSON, USN

SA CG ONE SIX
QUANG NGAI

LT W.R. OWENS, USNR

SA RAG THREE TWO
HUE

LT G.L. MAGER, USN

SA HARDU DANANG

LT D.W. WIRICK, USNR

SA CSC DANANG

LT R.M. SCOTT, USN

SECOND COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (CTG 213.2)

SA SECOND CZ
NHA TRANG

CDR A.S. JEFFERIS, USN

SA CG TWO ONE
DE GI

LT J.K. ENGELKEN, USN

SA CG TWO THREE
SONG CAU

LT E.L. SIWINSKI, USNR

SA CG TWO FIVE
DONG HAI

LT E.F. GIER, USN (D)
LT D.G. THOMAS, USN (R)

SA CG TWO SIX
BINH BA ISLAND

LT J.P. MCGRATH, USN

SA CG TWO SEVEN
NINH CHU

LTJG P. MILLER, USN

SA CG TWO EIGHT
PHAN THIET

LT G. NORDLAND, USN

SA HARDU NHA TRANG

LT J.E. BINGHAM, USN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SA HARDU QUI NHON	LTJG B. VALENTINE, USN
SA CSC QUI NHON	LCDR R. SAGEHORN, USN
SA CSC NHA TRANG	LT S.C. AREY, USN

THIRD COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (CTG 213.3)

SA THIRD CZ VUNG TAU	CDR J.G. SULLIVAN, USN
SA CG THREE THREE RACH DUA	LT F.M. LEMON, USN
SA CG THREE FOUR THANH PHO	LT B.R. MOFFETT, USN (D) LT E.J. GIBSON, USN (R)
SA CG THREE FIVE THU VINH	LTJG T.E. ARNOLD, USN
SA CG THREE SIX LONG PHU	LT C.L. DOBSON, USN
SA HARDU VUNG TAU	LT N. BARBOUR, USN
SA CSC VUNG TAU	LT D.R. ROGUS, USN

FOURTH COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (CTG 213.4)

SA FOURTH CZ AN THOI	CDR M.J. SHINE, USN
SA CG FOUR ONE POULO OBI	LTJG R. JOHNSTON, USNR
SA CG FOUR TWO AN THOI	LT O.R. COLE, III, USN
SA CG FOUR THREE HON TRE ISLAND	LT M.A. SOBYNA, USN
SA CG FOUR FOUR HA TIEN	LTJG D.C. SNYDER, USN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SA CSC AN THOI

LT P.D. MCCURDY, USN

THIRD RIVERINE ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 216)

SA THIRD RIVERINE ZONE
LONG BINH

CDR V. MCDONOUGH, USN

SA RAG TWO TWO
NHA BE

LT J. CALABOUGH, USN

SA RAG TWO FOUR
PHU CUONG

VACANT

SA RAG TWO EIGHT
NHA BE

LT R.M. ANDREWS, USN

SA RAG THREE ZERO
PHU CUONG

LT R.M. ANDREWS, USN

SA REG FOR RPG
CUU LONG

LT C.E. ROBE, USN

FOURTH RIVERINE ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 217)

SA FOURTH RIVERINE ZONE
CAN THO

CDR W. WARDELL, USN

SA RAG TWO ONE/THREE THREE
DONG TAM

LT K.J. PLIS, USN

SA RAG TWO THREE/THREE ONE
VINH LONG

LTJG R.E. BROWN, USN

SA RAG TWO FIVE
CA MAU

LT R.J. GILLESKIE, USN

SA RAG TWO NINE
BAC LIEU

LT W.T. MAGEE, III, USN

SA RAG TWO SIX
CA MAU

LTJG R.W. BASS, USNR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 228)

SA RSSZ NHA BE	CDR D. A. STEWART, USN
-------------------	------------------------

NAVAL TRAINING CENTER ADVISORY ORGANIZATION

SA NTC NHA TRANG	CDR P. R. FOURNIER, USN
SA NTC CAM RANH BAY	CDR R. R. WARD, USN
SA NTC SAIGON	CDR R. R. GROVE, USN (D) CDR R. A. WILD, USN (R)

LOGISTIC SUPPORT COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION

SA VNN LSC AND SA VNN DCOS LOG	RADM P. S. MCMANUS, USN
DEP SA VNN LSC	CAPT E. P. TRAVERS, USN
SA VNNSY	CAPT F. T. SHAVER, USN
SA VNNSC	CDR C. H. BARSTAD, USN
SA LSB AN THOI	LCDR R. W. HOTZ, USN
SA ISB RACH SOI	LT D. E. WARD, USN
SA ISB QUI NHON	LCDR T. A. HEAD, USN
SA ISB BEN LUC	LCDR C. W. ALBAUGH, USN
SA LSB DONG TAM	CDR W. M. COLE, USN
SA LSB CAT LO	LCDR S. UNGEMACH, USN
SA LSB CAM RANH BAY	CDR C. MCINTOSH, USN
SA LSB DANANG	CAPT R. PADDOCK, USN
SA LSB NHA BE	CDR A. L. BADER, USN
SA ISB THUAN AN	LCDR J. STEVENS, USN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SA LSB BINH THUY

CDR R. J. COEN, USNR

SA ISB LONG XUYEN

LCDR A. THIEL, USN

SA ISB LONG PHU

LT J. R. MURRAY, USN

SA ISB VINH LONG

LT W. MCALISTER, USNR(D)
LCDR J. LASWELL, USN (R)

SA ISB CAT LAI

LT J. F. MAYER, USN

SA ISB NAM CAN

LCDR R. BLEDSOE, USN

SA ISB CHO MOI

LCDR B. BURGETT, USN

SA ISB CA MAU

LT D. CHALFANT, USN

SA YRBM ALFA

LCDR G. CRAWFORD, USN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPENDIX IVGlossary of Abbreviations

The following abbreviations and terms are commonly used in the combat zone by all agencies and are listed here in amplification of those used in the text.

ABF	Attack by fire
AMMI PONTOON	A multi-purpose barge, standard size 28'x90'
AO	Area of operations
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
A/S	Air Strike
ASP	Ammunition supply point
ASPB	Assault Support Patrol Boat
ARTY	Artillery
ATC	Armored Troop Carrier
ATSB	Advance Tactical Support Base
A/W	Automatic Weapons
BDA	Battle Damage Assesment
BLACK PONY	OV-10 Aircraft, twin engine turboprop counterinsurgency
CCB	Command and Communication Boat
CG	Coastal Group
CHICOM	Chinese Communist

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group - mercenaries of Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian descent who fight primarily around their own villages.
CMD	Capital Military District
CONUS	Continental United States
CORDS	Civic Operations for Rural Development Support
CRIP	Civilian Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon
CSR	Camp Sentinel Radar
CZ	Coastal Zone
DIW	Dead in the water
DUSTOFF	Medical evacuation by helo
ENIFF	Enemy Initiated Firefight
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FOM	French Patrol Boat
FSB	Fire Support Base
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
GDA	Gun Damage Assessment
GVN	Government of Vietnam
HAFT	Helicopter Attack Fire Team
H&I	Harassment and Interdiction fire support
ISB	Intermediate Support Base
JGS	Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)
KIA	Killed In Action

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

KIT CARSON SCOUTS

Former Viet Cong who have come over to the side of the Saigon government and serve with allied military units.

LAFT	Light Attack Fire Team
LAW	Light Anti-tank Weapon
LCPL	Landing Craft, Personnel, Large
LDNN	Vietnamese equivalent of USN Underwater Demolition Team
LF	Local Forces (VC terminology)
LHFT	Light Helo Fire Team
LOH	OH-6 Light Observation Helicopter
LP	Lookout Post
LRRP	Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol
LSSC	Light Seal Support Craft
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MATSB	Mobile Advance Tactical Support Base
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Program
MID	Mining Interdiction Division
MONITOR	Heavily armored LCM-6 (40mm cannon or 105mm Howitzer)
MR	Military Region
MSB	Minesweeper, boat
MSD	Minesweeper, drone
MSR	Minesweeper, remote

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

MSF	Mobile Strike Force - mercenaries who deploy and go anywhere
MSSC	Medium Seal Support Craft
NGF	Naval gunfire
NGFS	Naval Gunfire Support
NILO	Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer
NIOTC	Naval Inshore Operations Training Center
NMCB	Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (Seabees)
NOD	Night Observation Device
NSA	Naval Support Activity
NSAD	Naval Support Activity Detachment
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
OJT	On-the-job training
OTC	Officer in Tactical Command
PBR	Patrol Boat, River
PCF	Patrol Craft, Fast
PF	Popular Forces
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
PRU	Provincial Reconnaissance Unit
PSA	Province Senior Advisor
PSDF	Popular Self-Defense Forces
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
RAC	River Assault Craft

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

RAD	River Assault Division
RAG	River Assault Group (VNN)
RAID	River Assault and Interdiction Division (VNN)
RAP	Rocket Assisted Projectile
REF	Reefer (ship)
RF/PF	Regional Forces/Popular Forces
RMK/BRJ	Civilian construction company in Vietnam
ROK	Republic of Korea
RPD	River Patrol Division
RPG	Rocket propelled grenade (or) River Patrol Group
RSSZ	Rung Sat Special Zone
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Air Force (or Armed Forces)
SA	Senior Advisor
SAR	Search and Rescue
SEAL	Navy commandos (<u>S</u> ea, <u>A</u> ir, <u>L</u> and)
SEAWOLF	UH-1B Helo, heavily armored, USN operated
SHADOW	C-119 aircraft
SKIMMER	20-foot fiberglass motorboat
SLICK	UH-1B, USA operated
SPOOKY	C-47 aircraft
SSB	Swimmer Support Boat (Skimmer)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STAB	Strike Assault Boat
TAOR	Tactical Area Of Responsibility
TAW	Tactical Air Wing
TP/PT	Convoy designation for ships travelling up the Mekong River from Tan Chau to Phnom Penh and vice versa
USARV	United States Army, Vietnam
USASUPCOM	United States Army Supply Command
VAR	Visual Air Reconnaissance
VNMC	Vietnamese Marine Corps
VNN	Vietnamese Navy
VNNSC	Vietnamese Naval Supply Center
VNNTC	Vietnamese Naval Training Center (Nha Trang)
WIA	Wounded In Action
ZIPPO	Flame thrower-equipped ATC or Monitor

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED